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FREEDOM'S BATTLE

BEING

HISTORICAL ESSAYS OCCASIONED BY THE GREAT WAR.

BY

J. F. WORSLEY BODEN, M.A.,
OF JESUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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

'For Freedom's battle, once begun,
'Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son
'Though baffled oft, is ever won.'

LORD BYRON, *The Giaour*

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
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TO THE MEMORY OF

HUGH CHARLES WOLLASTON BODEN,

CAPTAIN,

12TH BATTALION, SHERWOOD FORESTERS,

WHO WAS KILLED IN FLANDERS

IN THE SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY

AND THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM,

ON OCTOBER 11TH, 1915,

IN THE TWENTIETH YEAR OF HIS AGE.

'Qui ante diem periit:
'Sed miles, sed pro patria.'

HENRY NEWBOLT, *Clifton Chapel.*

NOTE.

If any apology be required for the publication of the following essays, all of which, with one exception, have appeared in substance in the leader columns of the *Madras Mail*, it may be accounted perhaps as implicit in the preceding inscription to the memory of my half-brother. Such a memorial can gain nothing by delay, and since I am expecting shortly to be engaged in military service myself, the process of putting together, amplifying and annotating these essays has been accomplished in some haste, and consequently not without considerable labour.

In this regard my thanks are due to Mr. O. H. T. Dudley, M.A., sometime Scholar of Wadham College, Oxford, and of the Indian Educational Service, for the benefit of his mature judgement and criticism; and to Mr. H. E. Bates, Assistant Editor of the *Advocate of India*, whose technical knowledge of Press procedure has made his advice invaluable on many points, and his assistance most welcome in the final revision of the proofs.

Finally, I must thank Mr. A. E. Lawson, C.I.E., Editor of the *Madras Mail*, for his courtesy in allowing me to republish the essays, most of which, in spite of alteration and expansion, I do not think he will fail to recognize. The only one which has not already seen the light in some form is that on 'Nationality and Patriotism.' In the case of those which marked the occasions of anniversaries, the dates of publication are given in footnotes.

J. F. W. B.

December, 1915.

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INTRODUCTION.

'Freedom's Battle' is a title which may fairly represent such unity of thought and intention as can be traced in the following pages. The absence of a complete coherence is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that, with two or three exceptions, the essays were written without any view of their going to the composition of one volume. Yet they derive a certain common purpose from their having all been occasioned by the present war, and from the fact that nationality and freedom must needs fill a large place in the writings of one whose historical reading has produced a thorough distrust of international theory and the plausible dogmas of pacifism. World-peace is surely as wild a dream as Weltpolitik. The achievement of the latter might, of course, in some measure accomplish the former by the compulsory methods of a military imperialism; but the world would never be really free from the volcanic eruptions of nationality. This would constitute a form of internationalism, albeit far removed from the international ideal of the pacifists.

If, however, the attainment of world-peace be attempted by the exclusion of Weltpolitik, the alternatives present themselves either of the free development of nationality or of the adoption of a frankly international pacifism. Our intellectuals, or some of them, are fond of saying that the profounder minds in all countries are agreed that the only hope for the future lies in internationalism;[1] but it is well to remember that the claims of nationality, which are the expression of patriotism, will accept no international sovereign who does not respect them. Not to condemn nationality, but to cherish it, is the surer road to a peace that is not 'full of wrongs and shames,' and can be finally accomplished only by a reformation of man himself. International interference, whether it take

[1] *E. g.*, Mr. Lowes Dickinson in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 1915, p. 35.

the form of German imperialist aggression or of the anti-national decrees of a Vienna Congress, or of the papal tyranny, which as a temporal force has happily become of no account in anything but pretension, is the assurance of international discord.

'Freedom's battle' is as old as humanity and as new as the new-born day. As the newness of the day cannot banish the consequences, or relieve, without human co-operation, the burdens of its predecessors' making, so the fight for freedom, however new, is the legacy of old successive struggles half won amid the shadows of the past. But newness has a power of its own. For as the brightness of the dawn illuminates the problems inherited from other days, inspiring man with new vigour and giving him new experience for their solution, so is every age equipped with a new strength and a fresh inheritance of accumulated experience, which is history. And thus the great conflict which is the latest phase of 'freedom's battle' is properly considered in its historical relations.

As in time past, so to-day, and so in time to come, injustice and tyranny must still provoke the righteous war: and wars of defence will cease to be righteous only when they cease to be defensive. Nationality, which is an historical growth, will continue to fight for its existence until its rights are recognized; that is to say, until righteousness has dispelled oppression and tempered ambition with justice. Since Germany, spurning all that was best in her civilization and her religion, has threatened nationality with extinction, the nations which cherish their nationality have been compelled to employ the militarism of justice to destroy the militarism of recrudescent savagery. Therefore the cause of nationality is the cause of freedom, of civilization, of religion; and is thus invested with the solemn strength of a moral principle. Of all who have died for England and the Empire, of all who are yet to die in such a cause, we may say with comprehension as Pericles said of the Athenians in the famous funeral oration:

'The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again and

again, each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres——I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men.[1]

To the great dead of ancient Athens this tribute was paid. To the great dead of England it is due to-day. And the final words of exhortation still address their appeal to the living: 'Make them your examples.' But this appeal presents itself in an interest which is more than merely national: it speaks in the name of every suffering nation. For 'we must remember,' as Pitt said more than a hundred years ago in a situation wonderfully suggestive of the present, 'that it is not for ourselves alone that we submit to unexampled privations.' It is also for the 'nations now bending under the iron yoke of tyranny.'[2] And, above and including all, it is for the sanctity of principle, which, while it transcends the actual safety of any single nation is yet dependent upon security against the hurricane of 'danger, the greatest that ever threatened the world.' In the supreme degree in which freedom is at once conditional upon its own identification with law, and itself the only sure condition of human progress, the conflict is compelling, and the call to sustain it irresistible—

> Yet Freedom! yet thy banner, torn, but flying,
> Streams like the thunderstorm *against* the wind.

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[1] *Vide* Thucydides II, 43 (Jowett's translation.)

[2] *The War speeches of William Pitt the Younger.* (Selected by R. Coupland).

A PLEA FOR NATIONALITY.

I.

NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM.

To Edmund Burke is due the origin of the dictum, 'the age of chivalry is gone.' Alarmed by the early progress of the French Revolution which seemed to him to threaten society with dissolution and property with lasting insecurity, fired with indignation by the apparently inflexible neutrality of the European Powers, and convinced that the course of public duty was to rouse his own countrymen to a sense of the growing peril across the Channel, he published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in the autumn of 1790. The actual outbreak of the European war and the Prussian invasion of France were nearly two years distant, and England was not to be involved until early in 1793. But Burke foresaw the large and dangerous possibilities of the Revolutionary movement in its early phases, and his patriotic energy was rewarded with a fair measure of success. Pitt, however, was immersed at the time in the problems of economic reform, and declined to agree that the troubles of France demanded any action beyond the expressions of good-will with which he assured the French of the amity of England. And it was Pitt's resolution to refrain from interference unless it should be required in the cause of self-defence which moved Burke to the scornful and depressing declaration: 'The age of chivalry is gone; that of sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever.'[1]

Alike the truth and the falsity of Burke's contentions were revealed in succeeding years. His conception of the magnitude of the French upheaval was justified in the twenty-two years of war which parted Waterloo from

[1] *Reflections*, Vol. III, p. 331.

Valmy; but his taunt was to prove unwarranted by the conduct and consequences of the great struggle. For two distinct developments came to qualify and even to reverse his melancholy conclusion. The energetic and determined policy of England which secured the salvation of Europe was the answer to the charge of apathy. And the emergence of the idea of nationality from the unity of the nation whose theories had seemed to threaten both herself and Europe with disintegration, was the assurance of a resurgent glory. The national unanimity of resistance and aggression which succeeded the airy cosmopolitanism of revolutionary theory, when France was confronted by a continent in arms, established a new idea of national consciousness which carried its contagion through Europe, and became the principal force in the history of the nineteenth century. It is the idea of nationality, the cause of national freedom, for which we are fighting to-day. Let the exponents of international theory, with its elaboration of supernational tribunals, not forget that Germany is the champion of an internationalism, and that if her ideal were attained she would herself constitute a supernational tribunal from which there could be no appeal.

The European assimilation and expression of this idea of nationality has been at once unexceptional and diverse. Unexceptional, because every European nation has felt its influence and in some degree embraced it: diverse, because by some nations it has been accepted as the principle of national self-respect which exhibits itself, not in original aggression but in zealous vindication of national rights; by others deliberately employed as a conscious and consolidating instrument of unprovoked hostility. For whereas in France the principle was a spontaneous growth of the Revolutionary wars and the subjugating strength of the Napoleonic armies, and in England it had even in some measure been anticipated through centuries of insular independence, the heterogeneous constitution of the German States and the Austrian Empire, and the humiliation of Prussia through the years of Napoleon's domination from Jena to Leipsic (together with her traditional

reliance upon the dynasty) made the influence of the idea in those countries dependent upon the continuous and increasing exercise of a unifying dynastic authority. The ascendancy of Prussia was a triumph of the idea, until in the heyday of the new imperialism, the German system was organized on the principle of nationality without the conditions of its nobler and freer expression. For the Prussian absorption of the German principalities and duchies produced an empire but not a nation; a federation of States, without the saving condition of national homogeneity was welded into an imperial entity by the artificial influences of the Prussian dynasty, the Zollverein and the military usurpation of political power and social liberty. Again, the medley of nationalities composing the Austrian Empire has ensured the artificial character of an imperial unity based upon the assertion of historic territorial right. In spite of her many nationalities, Austria is conspicuous among the Great Powers for the absence of nationality.

The kind of patriotism which discloses itself in arrogant prejudice against other countries is the natural concomitant of a theory of nationality adopted, as in the case of Prussia, as a means to the establishment of unchallenged military strength and expressing itself in the deification of the State. The mechanical employment of a theory which in other nations is rather an unconscious force of habit exactly illustrates and completes the new national militarism which grew out of the Prussian subjection to Napoleon. Thus nationality in Germany has filled the rôle of a subservient instrument in the scheme of external ambition. It has rather governed the development of England and France in the direction of internal liberty, generating a respect for the manifestation of the idea in other nations.

But even if the Germans are contending, as they profess, against the ideas of 1789, it is nevertheless true that the present is a war of national principles, not of dynastic interests; that even in the case of Germany, where the dynastic influence has been peculiarly powerful, the impregnation of the people with the artificial nationality has been the guarantee of unanimity and fervour in the scheme

of domination by military conquest.[1] The war has given expression to nationality in its various and distinctive forms. For while the traditional barbarism of Prussia, the old-time lust of blood and battle has re-arisen to fulfil the prophecy of Heine,[2] and has carried its contagion almost throughout the German Empire, the truer and less conscious, but not less vigorous, nationality has steadily disclosed itself in England and France, in Italy, where the struggle for national liberty has given it a peculiar force, and even in Russia, where the dynastic influence has been the most powerful and enduring. And under the fire of the German assault the spirit of nationality has expressed itself in what may be called a new chivalry in the nations which are allied for its preservation. For whereas Germany is fulfilling the Treitschkean ideal of the State which acknowledges no authority higher than its own, the Allied nations have assumed the obligation of proclaiming a higher power which is recognized in the impersonal authority of law. When the State arrogates to itself the right of violation of agreements because it accepts the authority of no tribunal by which judgement could be pronounced upon it, the analogy of private contracts necessarily fails and the slighted authority of law can be vindicated only in the process of armed retaliation. Just in so far as Germany has left behind, as a mere half-measure, the Bismarckian standard of international morality which was expressed in the view that treaties required recognition only *rebus sic stantibus*, the Allies insist upon the validity of treaties even *rebus non sic stantibus* until in view of the changed conditions the treaties are annulled, or their terms amended by consent. It is not denied that the nations of the *Entente* are fighting in self-defence. But

[1] This was clearly seen by Lord Acton who prophesied the consequences when he said that Prussian militarism was the greatest danger which threatened the Anglo-Saxon race. *Vide infra* Essay on *The War and Historical Sense.*

[2] 'And when once that restraining talisman the Cross is broken, then the smouldering ferocity of those ancient warriors will again blaze up; then will be heard again the deadly clang of that frantic Berserker wrath of which the Norse poets say and sing so much. The talisman is rotten with decay and the day will surely come when it will crumble and fall. Then the ancient stone-gods will arise from out of the ashes of dismantled ruins and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes; and finally Thor, with his colossal hammer, will leap up and with it shatter into fragments the Gothic cathedrals.'

that is not the whole of their cause. They are also the champions of a moral principle rooted in freedom and flowering in altruism.

The idolization of the State, which to the English mind is a rather nebulous institution, has given Germany some decided initial advantages which continue to prove their potency as the war progresses; and the species of nationality displayed by Germany and England respectively are as instructive as they are distinct. The German frankly accepting the blatant creed that might is right, has mastered the lesson of national service: the English, as a nation, putting their faith in the counter-doctrine that right is might have concentrated on liberty without perhaps quite recognizing the responsibilities which its enjoyment carries. Granted that the balance of the virtues is heavily in England's favour, yet in spite of the appalling consequences of the German creed in practice it does not follow that German nationality has no sound lesson to impart.

If it be thought that the English cult of individual liberty is the nearest approximation to the ideal laid down by Pericles in the funeral oration, it must fairly be noted that he was far from excluding service to the State from the obligations of citizenship. 'If,' he said, 'we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, ar we not greatly the gainers?.... We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character.'[1] It may be observed that since Pericles was speaking of the freedom of the Athenian life in contrast with the laborious military system of Sparta, he may have been tempted to exaggerate the advantages of freedom from military training. But 'courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law' does not carry the suggestion of unpreparedness. The readiness and competence of the Athenians was displayed in military service no less than in other spheres of life. Of the ubiquitous imperialism of Athens which was made possible by the energy of her citizens, the losses of one of the

[1] Thucydides II, 40 (Jowett's translation.)

tribes alone in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War afford unquestioned evidence.[1] So far indeed from the obligation of service being incompatible with liberty, it is rather the case that the moral claim is greater in the absence of legal force.

While national service properly includes service to the State in every kind, it has come to carry a military connotation as the definite policy of compulsory service to which Lord Roberts loyally devoted the closing years of his career. The problem provides an acute illustration of the diverse forces of nationality. The pursuit of freedom on the one hand and the security of the country on the other present themselves as conflicting interests. But the question really has its answer in the principle of the 'law of liberty': it is not whether national service is compatible with liberty, but whether liberty is complete without national service. For liberty unconditioned by law is a generating plant of all the anarchical and disruptive forces, which are at once the assurance of its own eclipse and of the explosion of nationality. The urgent pursuit of it becomes as dangerous to its existence as its denial is the guarantee of its virility. And since human nature itself is the ultimately governing condition, the realization of liberty will be proportionate to the exercise of human restraint. The success of self-government, as well in the national as in the individual sphere, is to be measured by the capacity for reverence, not by the exercise of independent disregard for the authority of law. This is the primary condition of liberty, which has secured its most complete expression precisely in those nations in which the idea of nationality has been the least fettered by the artificial but dominating forces of militarism and industrialism.

[1] 'Of the Erechtheid tribe: These are they who died in the war, in Cyprus in Egypt, in Phoenice, at Halieis, in Aegina, at Megara, in the same year.'
A stone bearing this inscription and the names of the fallen was set up in 459 B.C.

II.

Militarism and Industrialism.

Lord Bryce observed in his presidential address to the British Academy this year that there never has been a great war less dynastic than the present. The truth of his statement is a vindication of the principle of nationality which was an indirect product of the French Revolution and a principal characteristic of European development throughout the past century. Nationality is sometimes assailed as the influence which has fomented the present war, but a candid enquiry would exonerate all but the peculiarly mechanical theory of German nationality at the bar of the general judgement. There is one distinct aspect in which nationality may even be considered as in some sense a pacific influence. Although it has rather freely been labelled explosive, yet even where it has expressed itself in undisguised militarism it has contributed a useful service in suppressing another explosive, to which the realization of certain international ideals would present extensive opportunities of conflagration. The abolition of militarism is not the guarantee of peace. The abolition of militarism is the exaltation of industrialism. It is not true to say that these are in complete antithesis: they are rival claimants to the patronage of civilization; but they are also allies in the service of the Furies. In fact, they are at once antithetic and co-operative. Militarism threatens the products of industrialism with destruction, and yet furnishes some industries with a market which is most valuable precisely at the time when the menace of destruction becomes the fact of war. But while industrialism thus trades on militarism, its prosperity is for the most part dependent on freedom from those extreme

influences of militarism which embroil the nations in war. For, apart from the vested interests which are concerned in the construction of armaments, most industries would seem to find the assurance of prosperity in the maintenance of peace. In this sense, militarism and industrialism are set in the world in rivalry. Yet the very antithesis covers a tacit and unacknowledged alliance. For the prosperity which rises in a time of peace is itself the condition most favourable to war. Avarice grows with accumulation; defiance with prosperity; and the forces of militarism thus derive an incentive from national aspirations which do not necessarily express themselves in terms of hostility to other nations.

We cannot of course disregard the force which lies in the argument that international trade, by breaking down the barriers of nationality, tends to the maintenance of international peace. Within certain limits it is true that free intercourse either prevents, or settles before they assume very serious proportions, those minor disputes which in the past might have been referred to the judgement of arms. But the contention generally suffers from the same disability as the saying of Madame de Staël's that we forgive whatever we really understand. Nationality still retains a healthy virility which insists upon the distinction between honest rivalry and unprovoked assault, even when the motive underlying the latter is thoroughly understood. Neither can we ignore the view expressed in the language of Treitschke that 'war is the only remedy for ailing nations';[1] if in general two parties are required to constitute a quarrel, yet one nation's determination upon war as its national medicine means that war it must have. But this is surely a return to barbarism: for even Treitschke admitted that with the progress of civilization wars must become fewer and shorter. And it does not explain the occurrence of the present war from which Germany could have preserved the rest of Europe. For whatever the disease with which she was afflicted according to the standards of other nations, she was not ailing according to

[1] *Lectures on Politics* (Selections translated by A. L. Gowans) p. 23.

her own. The present war broke out when industrialism was in a condition of unusual prosperity. And it was not the first occasion on which Germany, or rather Prussia, had provoked a great conflict when, so far from requiring the stimulus of the 'dreadful medicine' she really perceived that a victorious campaign would greatly enhance her already strong position and add to her considerable authority. It was by the deliberate policy of Bismarck that the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 enabled the Prussian Kingdom to embrace the German States in a newly-constituted empire. And it is surely not an ailing but a prosperous nation, whose aspiration would be allowed to lead it into the dismaying complications which attended the outbreak of war in 1914.

If the antithesis between industrialism and militarism were unqualified, it would be difficult to explain the failure of so powerful a system to prevent the occurrence of a conflagration which, while it ministers to one main industry, is destructive of all the rest. But the attempt to find such an explanation becomes irrelevant when it is realized that both industrialism and militarism are expressions of a mechanical system created by the civilization which it now controls. Man has established an organism so colossal that he is now dependent upon it: he has given the reins to a system which has denied him his freedom, and threatens to dominate, nay is already dominating, his every motion and his very existence. Rebellion against this tyrannous creature can mean only starvation for the majority of those whose procreation it has permitted. Obedience it rewards in varying degrees; but faithful service does not always receive the mark of the meritorious in the assessment of so capricious a tribunal.

Industrialism and militarism are properly regarded as the products of a common stock. Their alliance is that of blood relationship: their quarrels those of cousins. Their rival claims are fiercely contested, but their common enmity to the world outside is greater than their mutual hostility. In different countries the strength of one or the other is predominating. Extreme instances furnish the most convincing illustrations. In Germany militarism,

in America industrialism, is the governing condition. The mechanical system of modern civilization has its quintessence in Germany, where, in obedience to the German theory of nationality, industrialism is the handmaid of militarism, which maintains internal order. In the United States, on the other hand, where in the absence of foreign danger militarism has had the least expression, the scarlet flower of economic disorder and industrial riot has been more prolific in its growth than in any other country. In England and France the conditions have been happily less extreme. Industrialism, which has been generally in the ascendant, has been vaguely assumed to carry the promise of peace. But if the pacifist is not entirely concerned with the prevention of war between different nations, he cannot have failed to realize the dangerously disruptive forces within each nation. It is the fear or threat of the former, and the consequent need of protection, which has largely held the latter in check. Militarism has maintained a state of order which seems to have blinded many otherwise observant people to the most extreme perils inevitable from an uncontrolled industrialism. For let any student of affairs ask himself to consider even broadly the possibilities of universal peace after the abolition of the present discredited militarism. He must, of course, conclude that the elements of militarism will remain in whatever system embodies the natural ideas of man: for man is militarist, and he is also covetous. And the accession to industrialism of wealth hitherto held for military purposes would enhance the prosperity which is itself the spring of discontent and the incentive to covetousness in action.

Let it not be forgotten in this connection that an important circumstance explanatory of the outbreak of the French Revolution was that the lower orders were better off, not worse off, than in other countries. Paris may have been in a state of starvation during the Reign of Terror, but that is irrelevant to the condition of the peasant class before the summons of the States-General[1]. This condition

[1] If this implied prosperity of the French peasantry should seem at the first sight to be rather a startling and even irrational cause of the greatest revolution

applies all the world over, and would certainly not be absent from the non-militarist industrialism which appears to furnish pacifists with visions of Utopia. By removing the only means of effective repression, the nations would have invited the simultaneous outburst of internal strife —that peculiarly degrading warfare between classes which is the negation of nationality. An international industrialism strengthened and enriched by the suggested (but impracticable) diversion of wealth from the requirements of a military establishment would present the possibilities of an economic Armageddon inconceivably more depraved than the most disastrous clash of those forces of nationality by which industrial revolutionary currents are now controlled. The concern of the one would consist in the attainment of designs for the satisfaction of collective selfishness: the other, as we see it to-day, is at least redeemed by the shining qualities of patriotism and self-sacrifice of which the principle of nationality is an actively generating power. Of the advent of a pseudo-pacifist industrialism unconditioned by the controlling influence of the forces of nationality, the language of Burke might well be employed:—'The age of chivalry is gone; that of sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever.'[1]

We shall rightly conclude, therefore, that the coveted era of peace will not be attained by the abolition of

of history, it will probably have been explained by the context. Had they really suffered the conditions extravagantly portrayed by Carlyle they could hardly have possessed the virility of revolution. Mr. C. R. L. Fletcher, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, who has edited Carlyle's *French Revolution* with conspicuous critical ability, deals with this question in his introduction, pp. 20 to 24, and observes (Vol. I, p. 18, note on the *Condition of the peasantry before the Revolution*) 'The lurid picture drawn here, and in so many places by Carlyle is so familiar to all superficial readers that it probably occurs to few to question the substantial truth of it. Yet I have no hesitation in saying that it is substantially untrue; and that the condition of the peasantry of France in the reign of Louis XVI compared, as far as material prosperity went, most favourably with that of all European countries, except perhaps parts of England; and even favourably with the condition of the French peasantry at the present time. Yet there were many burdens.....'——*vide* also H. Morse Stephens, *The Revolution and Europe*, Introduction, pp. 5—8, especially p. 8. 'It was because the French peasant was more independent, more wealthy and better educated than the German serf, that he resented the political and social privileges of his landlord and the payment of rent, more than the serf objected to his bondage.'

[1] *Reflections on the Revolution in France.*

militarism, as it is commonly understood. A valuable stride will certainly have been taken when the peculiar Prussian version of it has been stamped out through the bitter struggles of the present war. This is the vital need of the moment, but is properly described as a special case. For there is a common force in the world transcending all ordinary expressions of militarism, a basic and comprehensive force which lies at the root of all contention, whether it be expressed in wars between nations or within them, whether in external or domestic strife. Ruskin's uncompromising statement may have been excessive, but the degree of truth contained in it applies to the industrial no less than to the properly military sphere: 'the first reason for all wars, and for the necessity of national defences, is that the majority of persons high or low in all European countries are thieves.' It is easy to visit nationality with the gratuitous charge of co-operative theft; but the delusive simplicity of international theory has only to be tested in the light of modern history to show that if the idea of nationality has been productive of war, it has yet restrained the most disruptive and degrading tendencies, which, in the absence of military control, would lead to universal anarchy.

III

Nationality and Patriotism.

The catastrophe of war is not the condemnation of nationality. To say that the principle of nationality is the kernel of the present conflict is not to charge it with the responsibility of provocation. It is rather to find in the aggressiveness of Germany a challenge to that principle which is the best hope of a world in which rights and forces are necessarily expressed in national terms. The true nationality discloses itself in a national self-respect, unconscious of any national mission of aggressive conquest, but quick to resist with the force of arms the grasping ambitions which can lay no claim to the support even of the doctrine of 'legitimacy.'[1] It is, in fact, a moral principle which is concerned with the preservation of nationality within the bounds of its habitation, with the integrity of smaller States which are complete in polity but inconsiderable in power, and with the prevention or punishment of usurpation. When all has been said of political exigency and the balance of power, this principle remains a solid and unyielding force against the plausible denationalizing prescriptions of international theory.

It is no qualified apology for wars of defence to say that they are the sole alternative to the unrighteous concession of national principle. The present is a war in defence of nationality; it is the expression of national forces in defence of national rights, in the absence of an arbitra-

[1] The doctrine devised by Talleyrand for the purposes of the Vienna Congress, and consisting in the invocation of the theory of legal tenure by long possession in the case of individuals to justify a government in its claim to rule by historic right.

ment whose effectiveness must needs depend upon the existence of conditions which would render it superfluous. We may be sure that it is only when religion becomes universal and the profession of it at the same time sincere, if ever that be the case, that war or some sinister alternative will cease to be in some degree indispensable. The spectacle of professedly Christian nations grappling with all their might in the most colossal and destructive war of history is dismaying enough to provoke the scorn of the cynic; and it is not untrue that the old natural law of self-protection and survival has much to say in explanation. But it must also be conceded that national self-respect, which is a religious force, is a motive inspiration of the nations upon whom the security of the civilized world depends. The Central European Powers may claim it as their cause too, but if they be sincere in their profession, their manner of demonstration is strangely discordant with such nobility of purpose. In the scheme of œcumenic empire, or pan-German internationalism which that implies, there can be no place for the idea of nationality. It is the idea which is now struggling for its existence against a pretentious international tyranny, as surely as in another dress it fought and defeated in the sixteenth century the anti-national autocracy of Rome.

The futile and depressing figure of the papacy in the present war is the fulfilment of the rôle which might have been prognosticated as the result of historical enquiry. It is natural enough that the papal sympathy should go out to Austria, its principal stronghold in modern times, and once the seat of the Holy Roman Empire. But while the profession of neutrality cannot disallow the bestowal of a benign sympathy upon the Dual Monarchy and the aged Emperor, it might also be thought to dictate alike the suppression of prejudice against the principle for which other nations are contending, and the acceptance of the obligation to protest against violations of the rules of civilized war, which is the responsible rôle of a neutral Power. The action of Italy, which has transformed the Triple *Entente* into the Quadruple, is a fresh assertion of the principle of nationality against Germany's illicit design

of world-empire.—*Italiam laeto socii clamore salutant.*[1] But the joyful shout of salutation found no echo in the Vatican. The ancient capital of the Cæsars is still in pretension the boss of an international shield; and the papacy accords with its description as 'the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting crowned on the ruins thereof.'[2] And therefore the entry of Italy into the war in the cause of nationality and freedom, which on a superficial view might perhaps have been expected to qualify the attitude of the Vatican, has merely gone to confirm the papal policy of anti-nationalism which was consistently maintained through the struggles of Italian liberty.

Papal neutrality has been seriously qualified, however, in another direction. The very persistence of its own profession has excluded such a condemnation of the barbarous persecutions in Belgium as the interest of righteousness might have been thought to require from a neutral pontiff. But the assertion of national principle is an offence against the international pretensions of the papacy; and the hapless Belgians, papists though they be, have committed that singular offence: their nobility and vigour saved England and France from the worst consequences of the initial German offensive. A peculiar influence, moreover, seems to have governed the papal policy. For although the Hildebrandine system, which reached the climax of its fulfilment in the thirteenth century, is gone for ever as a practical policy, yet the theory of an ecclesiastical imperialism seems to find the approximation of its ideal in the œcumenic empire of German aspiration. And thus, while its neutrality does not prohibit either an unconcealed hostility to England and France, or the continuance of the accustomed opposition to the waxing strength of Italian nationality, yet the papacy yields a tacit condonation of the crimes which have already darkened the pages of history to an extent

[1] *Vide* Vergil, *Aeneid* III, l.524: Vergil was pre-eminently a poet of nationality, and it is no violation of his general spirit to read into the word *socii* its alternative meaning of 'allies,' which makes the verse so relevant to-day. *Socii* in this verse strictly referred to Aeneas's companions who responded to Achates's cry at the sight of the low-lying Italian coast near Brindisi.

[2] *Vide* Hobbes *Leviathan*.

unparalleled in the modern epoch—*Ce sont les épisodes de la guerre.*[1]

There is in the Catholic system an essential presupposition against nationality. 'Graeco-Roman Catholicism,' observes the Dean of St. Paul's, 'is not a religion which could ever have been evolved by free men. Obedience, loyalty, patience, endurance, self-devotion, gentle piety, all the virtues of the servile condition—these it could preach and practise. But "self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control," truthfulness and honour, fair play and fidelity to obligations, a social conscience and indignation at public crimes—above all, that intellectual honesty which dreads what Plato calls "the lie in the soul," even more than the lie on the lips—these never have been and are not the virtues which that type of Christianity tends to foster.'[2] It is not perhaps a very startling discovery that such a system, external, mechanical, and directed in the interest of a policy nominally spiritual but manifestly besmirched with temporal ambition, should find a reflection of its own ideals in the international designs of German imperialism.

It is a coincidence at once arresting and suggestive that the second year of the war should be marked by the seven hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Magna Carta. For not only is it no undue concession to the traditional exaggeration of its importance and accomplishment to set the great charter of 1215 and the great war of 1915 in the lineal descent of the struggle for liberty, but the contrast becomes at once apparent between the conspicuous power of the papacy in the one case and its singular fatuity in the other. The thirteenth century marked the zenith of papal sovereignty in Christendom, and the Hildebrandine ideal came nearer to its impossible fulfilment about the time of the Magna Carta in England and the fourth Lateran Council at Rome than at any other. For it was in the doctrine and practice of Innocent III. that the papal

[1] This, with a shrug of the shoulders, is reported to have been a Roman Cardinal's reply to a challenge on the score of papal inaction regarding the atrocities in Belgium.

[2] *Vide* W. R. Inge, D.D.: *The Church and the Age*, p. 55.

authority had perhaps its most conscientious and efficient exposition. His inauguration sermon had defined his conception of his office in the imperious claim that the Pope 'stands in the midst between God and man; below God, above man; less than God, more than man: he judges all and is judged by none.' 'Political accidents,' remarks a learned and considering scholar, 'and his own high talents and unblemished character enabled Innocent almost to substantiate these claims.' [1]

This amazing assumption of spiritual supremacy was the legacy of Cæsarianism in the Empire and was plainly as incompatible with nationality as was its secular prototype. For while we cannot deny that in mediæval times the papacy frequently showed itself to be a pacific influence in resolving the warring claims, or correcting the injustices, of kings, we must remember that nationality, as we understand it, was in its childhood. The fact that the mediæval church comprised in its orders not merely the clergy but all the then learned professions, and was the only sure medium through which the lowest of the people could obtain justice, and that its allegiance was owed directly to the Pope, constituted it an extra-national rather than a national force.

The English people owned the dual sovereignty of King and Pope; and before the development of the national constitution which rendered superfluous and even mischievous the privileges of the clerisy—the phrase *Church of England* is unwarranted as a description of the mediæval church in England [2]—this dual sovereignty

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[1] *Vide* A. C. Jennings, M.A., *The Mediaeval Church and the Papacy*, p. 58.

[2] The famous phrase *quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit* which describes the first concession granted in Magna Carta and appears both in Chapter 1 and 63, is as notable as it is open to misconstruction. In view of the international character of the mediaeval Church and the supernational authority of the Holy See, the idea of nationality suggested by the phrase cannot be assumed in any sense which would require the deposition of Rome in favour of Canterbury, of papal authority in favour of archiepiscopal. Yet the phrase was a definite departure from the use of 'holy church' in the charters of previous reigns. It is not unlikely that the patriotic and comprehensive spirit of Archbishop Stephen Langton, who furnished in some degree the force of homogeneity in the national coalition against King John, and performed the indispensable function of mediation between that coalition and the King, may have influenced the choice of a national phrase; but the most intelligible reason for its use seems to lie in the fact that the church which John had

(*Continued on page* 18.)

had decided temporary advantages. For although it was soon to prove an impossible system, yet in mediæval days the appeal from the justice (or injustice) of the royal authority served as a source of relief of which the value was incontestable. 'When the State,' observes the Dean of Durham, 'embodied in the mediæval king, was plainly unable or unwilling to do justice, it was a blessed circumstance that his tyranny should be confronted by another organized government proceeding on higher principles than his, and sheltering the most helpless members of society from his power. The moral validity of clerical privilege was measured by its practical necessity in the interest of social righteousness. This was the real justification for clerical immunities, not the fantastic arguments the clergy extracted from the Vulgate, and buttressed with the forged Decretals.'[1]

The anti-national claim to such privileges, justified as it was by the social conditions of the middle ages when the papacy was the strongest pillar in the edifice of civilization, was after all conditional upon the failure of a conscious nationality to organize itself in a patriotic system. The attainment of the latter was the condemnation of the former. But an assertion of nationality would not fail to incur the immediate and active disapprobation of Rome: witness the bulls which followed Magna Carta[2]; and on Hildebrandine principles it was a settled policy to perpetuate the differences of Church and State.

(*Continued from page* 17.)

misused was bounded geographically by the English coast line and might almost normally assume a territorial title without in any degree threatening its subservient relationship to Rome. *Anglicana ecclesia* as a collective indication of the recipients of the restored liberty was more precise than *libera* as a statement of the extent of the liberty. And in any event the condition of the mediaeval church renders the phrase quite irrelevant as a formula in the hands of modern Anglican reformers.

[1] H. Hensley Henson, D.D., at the annual gathering of Liberal Churchmen in London. *Vide Modern Churchman*, June 1915.

[2] In the first of these (August 24th 1215), which reached England after the departure of Archbishop Stephen Langton to attend the Lateran Council at Rome, Innocent III 'annuls and abrogates the charter after adopting all the facts and reproducing all the arguments furnished by the King....It goes on to describe Magna Carta as the result of a conspiracy and concludes, "We utterly reprobate and condemn any agreement of this kind forbidding, under ban of our anathema the aforesaid King to presume to observe it, and the barons and their accomplices to exact its performance, declaring void and entirely abolishing both the

'If the Christian Church,' to quote again the Dean of Durham, 'so far forgets its spiritual character as to become "a kingdom of this world," claiming for its hierarchy an independence of the Civil Power, and thrusting into every Christian State a rival claimant on the citizen's obedience, then, clearly the Christian citizen, just in so far as he accepts this hierarchic claim, becomes anti-patriotic.'[1] The hostility to patriotism implied in such a system is as manifest as the expression of patriotism in some form of nationality became inevitable. The national movement which forced the great cleavage of the sixteenth century both derived itself in part from the claim to religious freedom and gave a decisive place to nationality in religion.

The principle of nationality, being, as it were, the religious force of national freedom, has exercised an influence as favourable to personal and national religion as it has been hostile to the system superimposed by an international hierarchy. And the substitution of national churches for the extra-national system, which had sheltered and directed the growth of mediæval Christianity, gave expression to a new spirit in the national character. For it facilitated the alliance and even the identification of patriotism and the Christian religion, which papal internationalism had frequently succeeded in setting in embarrassed opposition. In England, which provides

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charter itself and the obligation and safeguards made, either for its enforcement or in accordance with it, so that they shall have no validity at any time whatsoever."'

Mr. McKechnie, the most recent and most illuminating writer on Magna Carta, from whose commentary I quote (*vide* p. 55., ed. 1905), proceeds, 'A supplementary bull, of one day's later date, reminded the barons that the suzerainty of England belonged to Rome, and that therefore nothing could be done in the Kingdom without papal consent. Thereafter, at a Lateran council, Innocent formally excommunicated the English barons who had persecuted "John, King of England, crusader and vassal of the Church of Rome, by endeavouring to take from him his kingdom, a brief of the Holy See."'

This bull also contained a reference to the King in whom is 'the best hope of deliverance of the Holy Land,'—a pretty description of the miserable John whose defiance of the Pope in the matter of Stephen Langton's appointment to Canterbury had brought upon England the horror of an interdict and upon himself the sentence of excommunication—curses to which he added by pillaging the church in his kingdom. It is a fine commentary upon papal diplomacy that the mere submission of such a king, by the anti-national course of making himself a papal vassal, should constitute him a hope of deliverance of the Holy Land.

[1] *Vide* H. Hensley Henson, D.D., *Notes of my Ministry*, pp. 132, 133.

the conspicuous example of this alliance, the maintenance of the connection between religion and the State has been little less than a political axiom.

In the case of France where the Reformation came nearly three centuries late in the fiery shape of the Revolution, the effect was a caricature of the sixteenth century cleavage: for its violence, which was proportionate to the period of its postponement, was directed against the Church with such intensity that the breach, so far from having been healed in the process of time, has grown steadily wider. But when the principle of nationality emerged from the Revolution with the force of a new idea, the theory of the nation's identity with the sovereign was displaced by the expression of a national consciousness which carried its contagion through Europe. The new nationality of the nineteenth century discovered the bitter hostility of the Pope to Italian liberty as it disclosed the severity of its own intolerance of the temporal pretensions of the papacy. The mechanistic theory of nationality in Germany has ousted nearly every other influence from the progress of the national life towards the supreme but impossible climax. *Descensus Averno* is truly the tale of the Prussian domination and indoctrination of Germany, which the legacy neither of the Reformation nor of the Counter-Reformation has availed to arrest. The influence of religion appears to have been excluded, save as an accommodating piece of the machine, with the deplorable results which have made the cause of the Allies the vindication of the moral principle of nationality.

Of the French political students who soon after the middle of the nineteenth century foretold, by reference to statistics, the coming preponderance of the English race, Lord Acton remarked: 'They did not foretell, what none could then foresee, the still more sudden growth of Prussia, or that the three most important countries of the globe would, by the end of the century, be those that chiefly belonged to the conquests of the Reformation. So that in Religion, as in so many things, the product of these centuries has favoured the new elements

and the centre of gravity, moving from the Mediterranean nations to the Oceanic, from the Latin to the Teuton, has passed also from the Catholic to the Protestant.'[1] The restoration of the coercive international control, which western Europe emerged from mediaevalism by overthrowing, would threaten nationality with a destruction hardly less complete than the triumph of the militarist and mechanical *kultur* of Germany. The realization of either is happily inconceivable; but both are there for a warning. The bitter hostility of the papacy to the growth of nationality, the violent assault of Germany upon national security, are the sufficient condemnation of the entire theory of international interference with the destinies of nations.

Patriotism, like religion in its more human expression, is essentially national. Both have their roots in the small environment which men call home; and cosmopolitanism, which is a valuable corrective of provincialism, is nevertheless an artificial cult. For while the love of country does not exclude the love of other countries, it makes a distinctive and fundamental claim which properly brooks no rival. The true patriotism combines a national confidence with a decent humility: it can never countenance the arrogant assumption of superiority which displays itself in the haunts of the vulgar. For that is not patriotism at all, but the crude, bombastic blustering of those who confess their ignorance, by expressing their contempt, of the state and accomplishments of other nations. The nations which have made the greatest progress are those which have been ready to adopt and employ the contributions of others to the common stock of civilization[2], and it cannot be maintained that a rigid and exclusive prejudice is patriotic.

But the common interests of the nations are ultimately subordinate to the fundamental claim of nationality. The patriotic postulate expresses itself in a determination to

[1] *Vide* Inaugural (Cambridge 1895) *Lectures on Modern History*, p. 9.

[2] *Vide* C. F. Bastable, LL.D., *The Theory of International Trade*, p. 149:—"The nations that have attained the highest place have not gained their position by exclusiveness, but by accepting frankly the material and intellectual productions of other countries."

resist external interference with national destiny. Not artificial and superimposed systems, but the simpler associations and natural relationships, produce the great aristocracy of patriotism, and gird the patriot with strength to the battle in his country's cause. The spirit of patriotism is generated amid scenes which remain precious in the mind wherever men move the world over. And on distant shores beyond the peril of the sea it is the memory of these simple things which speaks to the exile of his home. For when all has been said in praise of human accomplishment, of colossal empires and œcumenic churches and international commerce, man's nature has not greatly changed. And it is much the same spirit which is kindled, whether it be of the Englishman who after sojourning in a foreign strand rejoices to see once more the white cliffs of Dover, or of Ulysses of old time as he recalled in the Cyclops's cave his native shores of sea-girt Ithaca, of Dulichium and Samé and woody Zacynthus.[1]

[1] *Vide* Homer, *Odyssey* IX, l. 24.

AN IMPERIAL CONTRAST.

THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

Is the German Emperor an original megalomaniac, or is he an intentional or unconscious imitator of another and a greater? A comparison between William II of Germany and Alexander of Macedon presents a parallel which was not unfamiliar to the student of classical history in the days before the imperial aspirations of the head of the Hohenzollerns had come to receive such glaring illustration as is the case to-day. There is indeed some evidence for the belief that that modern potentate has attempted, not without conscious design, to model himself upon an ancient and distinguished pattern. And if to propose such a comparison should seem disparaging of the Macedonian conqueror, to insist upon the severity of the contrast is certainly not to exalt the Hohenzollern.

When allowances have been made for the changes which twenty-three centuries wrought in Europe, it must be admitted that the circumstances of the early environment of the two monarchs, and the tendencies of their upbringing, had much in common. The works of their respective fathers present a remarkable similarity both in design and accomplishment.[1] Only one important reservation must be made: Philip of Macedon can claim the credit of having established the first standing army and of having evolved the first European Power in any modern sense; whereas it was Frederick III's fortune to be born in a century when standing armies were the rule rather than the exception. Beyond this there is no qualification of any significance which our comparison can fairly be made

[1] If any be disposed to wonder at this reference to an emperor who reigned only a few months, it may be remarked that before his accession Frederick III played a considerable part in the schemes of Germanic consolidation. If he could not claim the credit, as against his father, William I, and Bismarck, for the entire organization of the new empire, he thoroughly shared the imperial and military spirit, and commanded one of the armies in the war of 1870.

to require, Philip and Frederick shared a community of ideals. Philip's perception convinced him of the superiority of a trained army over mere citizen militia; and the unifying principle by which he carried into effect his ideal of a standing army could hardly have been limited in design, vague as the design may have been, to the military sphere. Still less in actual practice could it have been so limited. The co-operation of tributary States was a condition precedent to the embodiment of their fighting forces in a national army. And thus the first step towards the fulfilment of Philip's military scheme was also the initial movement in the evolution of a national ideal and policy of which the army was to become the instrument. The turning point lay in the campaign in the middle of the fourth century B. C., when 'the Macedonians marched out an alliance to return a union.'[1] As with the Macedonians so with the Germans. How nearly this tale of military and political evolution may be repeated in the case of Germany is readily seen by a reference to the Franco-Prussian War. The organization of the Prussian army, which had been in process for some years, was no more political, in so far as concerns the direct intentions of the organizers, than that of the Macedonian. But there is no reason to suppose that the principle of unity of purpose, which is necessarily national and political even when its expression takes effect in military action, was realized any less keenly in the modern instance than in the ancient. The cardinal principle which governed both lay in the recognition that war is the great generating instrument of national unity. And so the words which we have already borrowed in the case of the Macedonians of 352 B. C. hold good of the Germans of 1870. They too 'marched out an alliance to return a union.'

The comparison of the works of the fathers may be extended hardly less forcibly to the ideas of the sons. Alexander was born only four years before the Macedo-

[1] *Vide* D. G. Hogarth, M.A., *Philip and Alexander of Macedon*, p. 50, from which I quote with some freedom.

nian campaigns which brought Philip's policy to fruition; William II of Germany was only eleven years old when the Prussian armies triumphed over France. Each came to inherit the legacy of a new and potent system in which he had been brought up. Each was endowed by nature (not quite in the same degree) with faculties of a type well qualified to maintain the dual principle of an armed nation with a common national ideal. The lives of both were early infected with the atmosphere of a disciplinary system. So rigorous was the Macedonian that an officer of Philip's who was reported to have indulged in a hot bath was summarily dismissed by his master with the scornful exclamation: 'A Macedonian woman washes in cold water in childbed!' And the influences of early discipline have always been apparent in the temperate and ordered habits of the Kaiser. Both were possessed in their youth of an unusual precocity; both sought out what they believed to be royal roads to knowledge. Alexander was early impressed with a belief that he was something more than mortal, as it were a demigod of Homer's world; and although his deification as Ammon was of no great account (for it was the claim of every Pharaoh of Egypt to be of divine birth, a claim incumbent and as of course, which Pharaoh himself could not repudiate) he continued through his life to assume a divine warrant for his imperial mission to the ends of the earth.

At the Olympian Games, when he was still but a boy, he declined to compete with any but his social peers, and in later days 'he would grasp the innermost mysteries of philosophy before he had learned well its rudiments; he thought to have penetrated the *arcana* of medicine, and gravely lectured his most venerable physicians.'[1] These indications may have served to establish a similarity in character between the Macedonian and the modern potentate who, at the age of seven, was confident of his ability to instruct Mr. Frith, the painter, in the arts of which the latter was an acknowledged master. His idiosyncrasies hardly require exposition; they have become

[1] *Ibid*, p. 165.

only too familiar through the volumes of current literature which every bookstall advertises and most newspapers have reviewed. One more point of comparison is fairly warranted. Alexander's pre-eminence over his followers completely disallowed the submergence of his individuality in that impersonal system to which one of his conscious imitators, Augustus, found submission to be the clear course of political wisdom. How far William II has been forced to accept a system, how far he has himself fostered and controlled it, are questions not strictly relevant to the fact of his exaltation. But this at least is certain, that in so far as personal desire has been able to take shape in political design, no means have been neglected by which the imperial figure could be made to stand out as the acknowledged source of all power in the State, the diotrephean 'king for whom the kingdom is.'

The parallel cannot be pressed further. It is properly confined to the early environment, and the conscious or unconscious moulding of the modern on the pattern of the ancient, which such environment may have encouraged in a character inclined to be imitative, and, within certain limits, not unlike the pattern. The sphere of achievement, however, makes inevitable the substitution of contrast for comparison. The exploits of Alexander have inspired a romance which has far exceeded the records of true history. Within twelve years of Philip's death Alexander had conquered the entire western East from the Nile to the Indus, and had set up the capital of his empire at Babylon. And thus, at the age of thirty-two he was proceeding, by the substitution of the ideal of world-empire for his father's more modest conception of Greek unity, to turn the imperious current of his attentions to the conquest of the West.

An important distinction has to be made between the work of the Macedonian and the designs of the modern German. It is as creditable to the one as it is unfavourable to the other. The conquests of Alexander are justified not merely by their military success: they served in a measure unparalleled before the imperialism of Julius Cæsar, to carry the contagion of the highest civilization to coun-

tries to which it would otherwise have been inaccessible. For whereas the imposition of German *kultur* upon a conquered world of equally civilized peoples—*quod Di avertant*—could in no sense be accounted a benefaction, and the attempt to impose it is an outrage upon the sacred principle of nationality, the inequalities of civilization in the days of the Macedonian supremacy not only warranted the dissemination of Greek culture by imperial conquest, but invested it with the illuminating strength of a new gospel. Not only do the circumstances of his conquests absolve Alexander from the charges which are laid with just and unrelenting insistence against Germany, but his methods and his policy towards the subject races are a positive condemnation of the practice of Germany, and rather present themselves as the precedent of the imperial system of Great Britain. The encouragement which he gave to the insinuation of Greek culture was tacit rather than forced. He trusted it to secure its own adoption among peoples whose traditions and institutions he was careful to preserve. The policy which expressed itself in the adoption of Persian dress and customs, so far from suggesting oppression of the conquered, was inclined rather to provoke the resentment, by exciting the prejudices, of the Macedonians who failed to appreciate the comprehensiveness of the great captain's imperial policy.[1] It is certainly not the liberal imperialism of the Macedonian that the modern Prussian has set up as his pattern. The subjects of his imitation, whether it be conscious or unconscious, can be no more than the fact of conquest and the dominating figure of the conquerer. And if it has not been granted to the modern imitator of ideas to carry into effect the Germanic scheme of world-empire, one cause of the failure is patent and familiar. In the modern circumstances of extensive civilization the overweening ambition of single rulers or of a single military party cannot be allowed to lead armies abroad with impunity, or to ride roughshod into the fenced cities of their neighbours. But is this a complete and satisfy-

[1] *Vide* Professor Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 794.

ing explanation of the difference in the case in question between the pursuit of an ideal and successful achievement? The Prussian system, as revealed in the present war, has been aptly described as 'Napoleonism without a Napoleon.' And if, in like simile, we insist that the conception of an Alexandrine ideal requires for its fulfilment the genius and generalship of an Alexander, we must postulate also the translation into modern conditions of the military superiority of the Macedonian phalanx over the barbarian hordes.

That postulate, however, is plainly irrelevant in the European war of to-day. The urgent and compelling force of the military system to which the docile German people have so long been subject has failed to produce that military superiority; and such disparity as does exist is actually in favour of the Allies. The armies of the modern champions of world-empire are daily proving their inability to encroach permanently upon the countries at whose expense alone the Prussian ideal could have been attained. This contrast between the modern and the ancient becomes accentuated in the sphere of generalship. The personal leadership of Alexander, the idol of his devoted army and the 'darling of rude men,' who shared their hardships and their triumphs, has no parallel in the delegated command by which the Emperor commits the fortunes of Germany to a staff of generals whose abilities are being tried for the first time upon the battleground of serious action. It was the personal relationship of Alexander with his soldiers of the Asian conquest which counted for so much in the success of his arms, and the Macedonian is still 'a master to all masters in war' and the only general of history, with the exception, perhaps, of Cromwell, who won all his battles. The possibilities of comparison and contrast cannot rightly be pressed in the changed conditions of modern warfare, but the earlier parallel is beyond question, and in the sphere of contrast we may venture perhaps to adapt a familiar formula:—'There may be many emperors ere such another Alexander.'

THE NEARER EAST AND THE WAR.

The war which is ravaging the face of Europe bids fair also to change the complexion of the East Mediterranean. The significance of this phase became apparent when the discreditable methods of German coercion first secured the apostasy of Turkey and the collapse of her understanding with Great Britain. The peculiar interest and importance of this development lie not more in the actual fact of war with Turkey than in the circumstance of renewed military contact between the great Powers of Europe and the western coasts of Asia. It has brought into the political sunlight the shores and sea-girt islands wherein the seeds of Western civilization were first sown, where European-Greek entered the lists with the forces of Asia, and opened the great debate which is still unclosed. It was here that Rome extended her Eastern dominion until she absorbed nearly the whole of Alexander's Oriental empire, and set up her new capital at Byzantium; it was here that the Crusaders, in spite of all their faults and failures, first showed to the world that selfish aggrandizement is not the only, nor the highest, motive of war; and here that the crowning achievement of Ottoman aspiration proved itself to be the summit from which the historian traces the beginnings of Turkish decline. The year 1453 is a famous date in European history. The capture of Constantinople cast a shadow over the East, but brought enlightenment to the West; for the dispersal of the Byzantine scholars throughout western Europe bore its precious fruit in the Renaissance and, in a sense, the Reformation, and thus heralded the dawn of modern history. The catastrophe which Constantinople can hardly escape, and the inevitable reconstitution of Nearer Eastern relations, may serve as the sufficient warrant for a retrospective view of some conditions of East Mediterranean lands, together

with a reference to the contact of European and Asiatic.

It is generally conceded that the British policy has gone nearer to the accommodation, if not to the understanding, of East and West than any other in modern times; and it is manifest that Germany's miscalculation of the attitude of the Asiatic and African subjects of the British Empire was not the least of her blunders. Just as the strain which the breach between Turkey and the Allies was expected to impose upon the Moslem subjects of Great Britain failed to alienate them from the British, so it was too great to secure their subscription to the distorted counsels which dominated the capital of the Ottoman Empire. And it can hardly be questioned that it is the principle of toleration, the British *kultur*, or rather *no kultur*, to which we owe the responding allegiance of Islam. The phenomenal rally to the British flag of the peoples and places affected by the action of Turkey was early signalized by the loyalty of the Moslem population of Cyprus, which hastened to assure the British Government of its unswerving devotion, and thus to vindicate the Protectorate, which was established in 1878. If it be argued that Cyprus has definitely become British territory, and has, therefore, no proper place in a consideration of the present phase of the war, it may fairly be urged in reply that that little island serves as well as any part of the Nearer East to illustrate alike the relations of European and Asiatic, and the desolating effect of Turkish ascendancy over a once flourishing community.

The long, uninterrupted rule of the Turk has left a sorry superscription upon the classic soil of Cyprus; for whereas the ancient history of the island was a record of progress, and the most recent, again, has been full of promise, a signal stress may properly be laid upon the failure of the island to play any part in modern history or to rise from a condition of commercial stagnation throughout the three centuries of Turkish government. The first fame of Cyprus arose in the age of bronze to which her wealth of copper ore made an indispensable contribution; and when the invasion of Greece by the Greeks of history, which had been in progress since the third millenium, produced a

revolution in the conditions of Mediterranean lands, Cyprus became prominent in conjunction with Egypt and the Ægean in the civilization which took its name from Mycenae. It was not until the twelfth century B.C. that the Greeks actually struck out across the sea and carried the Ægean civilization to the coast of Asia. A century later the movement was still in progress, and Cyprus, having made her contribution to the Mycenæan age, was destined to fill a more momentous rôle in the affairs of the Mediterranean. Her position made her a point of call and communication, a meeting place of trade routes between Europe, Asia and Africa. On the soil of Cyprus Greek and Phœnician met and mingled; and out of the civilization of the Ægean and the new strains from the east there arose the phenomenon of the worship of Aphrodite which has marked her for all time as the genius of Cypriot culture.

The brilliant legacy of Cypriot mythology, which the modern world has inherited primarily through the avenue of classical Greece, has been enriched by the labours of the archæologists whose excavations in ancient sepulchres and amid the 'chronicles of stone and clay, of gold and bronze,' were made possible by the establishment of the British Protectorate. The European debt to Cyprus was at once increased by the new flood of enlightenment, and in a measure repaid by the security afforded to the large Greek population. An interesting survival of an ancient cult may be remarked in this community which has carried the traditions of its island home into its newer religious system. Cypriot Greeks, who far outnumber the rest of the population, speak of the Virgin Mary as Aphroditissa, and thus perpetuate the title of antiquity.[1]

The ancient importance of the island as a centre of Levantine trade has been rivalled only by a period of its mediæval history, and by the renewed and growing commercial prosperity of the present day. The Latin Kingdom of Cyprus, which followed the Arab occupation towards the end of the tenth century, enjoyed, in spite of a miscellaneous population, both peace and the prosperity of a

[1] *Vide* Löhber, *Cyprus*, p. 105, cited in Farrar's *Life of S. Paul*,

fertile land.' This happy condition endured until the reign of Manuel Comnenus, whose nephew, Isaac, had been appointed by him to govern the Armenian frontier, but returned to Cyprus in 1184 and set up an independent kingdom. So depraved and despotic was his rule that Neophytus, the contemporary chronicler and author of the tract, *De Calamitatibus Cypri*, did not hesitate to describe the seizure of the island by Richard Cœur de Lion as an act not of piracy but of emancipation. The English occupation was brief—'Richard bestowed on the island the inestimable gift of his presence for five days after the Emperor surrendered'[1]—and the conferment of the crown of Cyprus upon Guy de Lusignan, whose claim to the hereditary Kingdom of Jerusalem was no more than shadowy, permitted a partial recovery of the internal fortunes of the island. The dynasty endured for some three centuries, and is notable for the reigns of Hugh III, known as 'The Great,' to whom St. Thomas Aquinas dedicated his treatise, *De Regimine Principum*, which became a handbook of the relations of Church and State in the Middle Ages; and of Hugh IV, 'a prince who is known in literary history as the king to whom Boccaccio dedicated his Genealogy of the Gods.'[2] Ten years before the death of the latter, Ludolf of Suchen, the traveller, described the barons of Cyprus as the richest in the world. The house of Lusignan came to an end soon after the fall of Constantinople, and after eighty years of Venetian rule, Cyprus was seized by the Sultan, Selim II, in 1571, and was thus embodied in the Ottoman Empire.

Cyprus has enjoyed or suffered the domination of every Power which has gained ascendancy in the Nearer East. Hers has ever been a chequered history, fulfilling, almost without exception, the conditions determined by the Greek invasion—an outpost of Europe, in perpetual contact with Asia, sometimes with Egypt, never continuing in one stay, and ever providing the cause, or suffering the consequence of trouble. Of the fortunes of its Greek population it might well be said,—*Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.*

[1] *Vide* Bishop Stubbs, *Mediaeval and Modern History*, p. 186.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 218.

But although it provides so effective an illustration of the ebb and flow of European and Asian conquest, Cyprus has been more fortunate than other parts of the Levant less dangerously, because less prominently, situated. Its very geographical prominence put the island in the way of great movements. The intensity of its Hellenization in ancient time; the Roman occupation in the days of the Empire; the establishment of the Christian Church under a Cypriot Archbishop; the protection of the Byzantine Emperors; the comparatively prolonged preservation from Ottoman hostility, first by the presence of the Crusaders and afterwards by the forces of Genoa and Venice—these are among the moulding influences which, together with the natural richness of the island, enabled the Cypriot population to survive the three centuries of Turkish domination.[1] The conditions which the history of Cyprus discloses are true in varying degree of much of the Levantine littoral; and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the recent perplexities of Nearer Eastern politics are to be attributed, not to any direct legacy of European and Asian rivalry, but to the ascendancy of Turkey both in Europe and on the western coasts of Asia. Like Cyprus, the latter are to a great extent the home of European Greeks, and the source of trading interests of which Turkey has not merely discouraged but practically disallowed the development. The fertile regions of the lower Balkans have already been emancipated from Turkish control, and it may fairly be expected that after the war, perhaps even during its course, a large portion of the East Mediterranean lands will be relieved of an alien rule, and thus enter upon an ancient heritage of prosperity.

After four hundred and sixty-two years of usurpation, the corrupt reign of the Turks in Constantinople is about to be cut off. Their alliance with Germany, which is the assurance of their expulsion, lends a new emphasis to the unequivocal language of Bishop Stubbs in a statutory lecture at Oxford in 1880. 'For the perishing remnants of Turkey,' he said, 'a faint plea of territorial possession has gone forth, but the conscience of friends and the deter-

[1] *Vide* D. G. Hogarth, M.A., *The Nearer East*, pp. 245, 246.

mination of foes have alike repudiated it as an excuse for misgovernment and palliation of tyranny. There is no idea, no such justification for that curse of Christendom. Turkey means nothing, represents nothing but butchery, barbarism, and the vilest slavery.'[1]

The operations in the Dardanelles and on the Gallipoli Peninsula have served to concentrate attention and resolve upon a crucial issue. And the barbarous and unparalleled persecution and destruction of Armenian Christians have intensified the conviction that the restoration of Constantinople to Christendom is the first guarantee of the conditions of liberty and ordered progress in the Nearer East.



[1] *Mediaeval and Modern History*, p. 275.

A CHAPTER OF ANCIENT IMPERIALISM

The naval operations in the Ægean have called up a number of ancient names of an interest which transcends the purely academic study of Greek history. Myth, legend and history are strangely mingled in the cosmopolitanism of ancient chronicle, and in none more than that of the war which raged for ten years round Troy on a site which verges on the Ægean Sea and the mouth of the Dardanelles. The island of Tenedos, where some thousands of Turkish prisoners have been interned, was in sight of Troy and recalls the lines of Vergil—

Est in conspectu Tenedos, notissima fama
Insula, dives opum, Priami dum regna manebant.[1]

But what is more relevant at the present time is the history of the domestic war between Athens and Sparta which is known to posterity as the Peloponnesian. It is a paradox which is in no sense superficial that the struggle between two States of a small country was an œcumenic war. For it concerned as much of the world in the fifth century B.C. as was, in any European sense, civilized. The States which were involved in it contained the political ideas and institutions which were destined to mould the future of civilization, and were thus of world-wide and perennial consequence.

A reference to this ancient war is valuable for three precise reasons. First, its importance might not have been appreciated had it not given to the first historian, in the modern sense of the word, the opportunity of demonstrating the methods of historical science which are virtually the methods of to-day. To deny that any advance has been made since Thucydides would be, of course, absurd, but the improvements are trifling in comparison with the gulf which lies between Thucydides and all that preceded him. His historical principles are in the main

[1] *Aeneid*, Book II., 21, 22.

the principles of the present time, and to Herodotus, his immediate predecessor, who ceased to write only a few years before he began, would have been almost as incomprehensible as 'the sphere to the dwellers in flatland.' The history of the Peloponnesian War, as recorded in the pages of Thucydides, may be defined as the 'decline and fall of the Athenian Empire.' The phrase will have suggested Rome, and like Rome at a later period, so before her fall was Athens, as Professor Bury has said, 'the centre of œcumenic history.'[1]

Secondly, the military conditions of the war were peculiar and arresting. A Power almost wholly naval was opposed to a Power almost wholly military. Throughout the first decade of the war while the Athenian fleet had to content itself with assaults upon the coastal possessions of Sparta, the Lacedaemonian armies were directed to ravaging the continental territory of Athens. Alike the military forces of Athens and the naval strength of Sparta were engaged almost entirely in defensive operations. Continental enterprise on the part of Athens was a product of peaceful, not of warlike, conditions, and in the year 431, on the outbreak of war, Pericles abandoned it. So complete was his determination to concentrate upon sea-power, that he recommended the entire desertion and even voluntary destruction of Athenian property in Attica. 'Men may give these,' he said addressing the Athenians, 'but these will not give men . . . go yourselves and destroy them, and thereby prove that none of these things will move you. . . . Such is the power which the empire of the sea gives.'[2] If the later course of the war showed the mistake either of Pericles in trusting so completely to the sea, or of his successors in embarking upon disastrous land engagements, notably on the hostile soil of Sicily, at least it showed also the spirit and vigour of the Athenians no less than the more deliberate and stoical determination of the Lacedaemonians. And 'the glory that was Greece' becomes a pathetic reflection in the political circumstances which have required the neutrality

[1] *History of Greece*, p. 399.
[2] Jowett's translation of *Thucydides*.

of modern Greece in the operations which are nothing less than a war of liberation from the tyrannous legacy of mediæval catastrophe. For she owes her freedom in Europe to-day mainly to the sentiment attaching to those ancient traditions which would surely dictate an honourable part in the fight for the recovery of the mediæval capital of the Byzantine Greeks.

Thirdly, the political aspect of the war has a permanent historical value which the subsequent and continuous revolution in the methods of war has, to a great extent, denied to the military. It was at Athens that the conception of an imperial democracy was first realized in a system which aimed at building upon the Greek principles of self-government a confederacy of free States under the central and unifying hegemony of the capital city. Out of the Confederacy of Delos, which had served to consolidate the islands of the Ægean and the Greek cities of western Asia in the face of the common danger of Persian aggression, grew the Athenian League. Established as a league of defence, it became under the influence and designs of great statesmen, Themistocles and Pericles, an empire of expansion. 'Of the two divisions of the world accessible to man,' such were the words with which the Greek historian credits Pericles, 'the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute masters; and have, or may have, the dominion to any extent you please. Neither the Great King nor any other nation on earth can hinder a navy like yours from penetrating whithersover you choose to sail.'[1] Pericles nevertheless encountered no little opposition in carrying out his designs for the maintenance and expansion of a confederacy of which the *raison d'être* had practically ceased to exist. And shortly after his death, at an early stage of the war, the imperial policy provided an illuminating example of an ancient *kultur*.[2]

The Athenian Empire involved an artificial neutralizing of those principles of self-government which it is

[1] Jowett's translation of *Thucydides*.

[2] I use the word advisedly; for the rigid and disciplinary imperialism reached its climax under the rule of uncultivated democrats. Democracy and liberty are by no means synonymous.

the great glory of Greece to have given to the world. This unhappy contradiction of ideas in the constitution of the Empire finds in the revolt of Mytilene its all-sufficient illustration. The true Hellenic instinct which governed the Mytilenaeans resented the Athenian domination over the free allies. The revolt was directed not against any specific injustice, but on the principles of autonomy, which had been made to suffer the restrictions of imperial expediency. All the cities of the island of Lesbos, save one, united under the leadership of Mytilene and joined the Peloponnesian League as a protest. Mytilene was blockaded by the Athenian fleet, and, in the absence of help from Sparta, surrendered at discretion. The ringleaders of the revolt were taken to Athens, and Mytilene was left under an Athenian commander to await the judgement of the Assembly. The considerations which determined the Athenians upon a policy of 'frightfulness' were admittedly exasperating. The revolt of a virtually independent ally from an imperial mistress who was already battling with the twin crises of external war and domestic pestilence might well move even a considering administration to inflict a penalty of some severity. Unlike the insurrection of a properly subject State, for which the plea of some specific hardship might have secured treatment at once less inclement and more justly warranted, the action of Mytilene was nothing less than a blow at the heart of the Athenian imperial ideal. It was a direct challenge to the constitution of the Empire, a signal that the overlordship at Athens was regarded as a restriction both unnecessary and mischievous.

Unchecked by the salutary and restraining influence of Pericles, who was now no more, the Assembly was seized with the over-mastering instinct of self-preservation, and was readily swayed by the counsels of the demagogues in office, whose patriotism was untempered by experience and uncontrolled by tradition. Under the guidance of Cleon, not 'the poet from the sprinkled isles,' but Cleon the leather-merchant, who had taken to heart the advice of Pericles that the subject allies should be kept well in hand, the Athenians voted for the massacre of the entire male

population and the enslavement of the women and children of the revolted city; and a ship was at once despatched to Paches, the Athenian commander at Mytilene, with the sentence of doom. But as soon as the decree was on its way, many of the members of the Assembly began to relent: common humaneness and political wisdom alike dictated a re-consideration of the barbarous and hasty measure. An extraordinary meeting was held on the following morning; and the decision was reversed by a narrow majority. The defeat of Cleon and the party of violence was secured by the persuasive reasoning of Diodotus, whose appeal to considerations of political expediency has given him an acknowledged place in the annals of political debate. The immediate problem then became the cancelling of the previous sentence. Never ship sailed with more determined purpose or frenzied speed than the trireme which conveyed the decree of the repentant Athenians. The crew were fed at their oars and never ceased to row until the harbour of Mytilene was reached. The first ship, which had about twenty-four hours' start, had only just arrived. Paches received the second decree when he was already preparing to put the first into execution. Thus the city was saved. The Mytilenaeans expiated their guilt by the sacrifice of the ringleaders who were already at Athens, and by the division of the island of Lesbos, excepting the loyal city of Methymna, among Athenian cleruchs or lot-holders.[1]

The case of Mytilene serves to illustrate politically alike the strength and weakness of the Greeks. Their own most precious contribution to the world, fearless freedom of thought, which expressed itself in the independence of the city state, was the undoing of Pan-Hellenism, and sufficiently explains the futility of their attempts to realize that political and imperial unity which, by 'the austere laws of history', was reserved for future ages, for Macedon, Rome and Britain. The Athenian Empire endured for some fifty years, and was not dissolved until the glory of Athens,

[1] Cleruchy did not convey independence; cleruchs retained their Athenian citizenship; and therefore so long as the Athenian Empire remained intact the loyalty of Mytilene was assured.

the centre of sea-power and of civilization, had first overshadowed the less ambitious hegemony of Lacedaemonian militarism, by which it was ultimately overcome. It was a half-century of productive genius, of the fruits of which the failure of the imperial ideal was happily not allowed to deprive mankind. For if our debt to Athens is no more than indirect, it is expressed none the less in the terms of political science, of literature and of art, yet not in such terms alone, but in something more intensely human which enshrines the essence of their varied legacy. To Philip and Alexander of Macedon it is due that the Greek was driven forth from the frontiers of his little state, and 'went out to be the leaven of a world which had not forgotten art and theory but was no longer to live by art and theory alone.'[1] And thus we realize the comprehensiveness of the Athenian legacy, and echo the sentiment of her own poet :—

> O rich and renowned, and with violets crowned,
> O Athens, the envied of nations!

[1] *Vide* D. G. Hogarth, M.A., *Philip and Alexander of Macedon*, pp. 156, 157

THE WAR AND HISTORICAL SENSE.

A POISONOUS pamphlet written in Germany has attributed the European embroilment to the deceitfulness of England. It is typical of much of the current German literature of the war, and contains a plaintive protest against the late King Edward VII, whose diplomatic energies it misconstrues into a conspiracy against Germany. That the King whom we have learned to revere as the Peace-maker should thus be branded as 'that accursed Prince of German blood,' and as 'the arch-enemy of Germany,' whose only rival in the field of sinister manœuvring is his testamentary executor, Sir Edward Grey, implies on the part of the Germans a total lack of comprehension. It is not, apparently, a want of sincerity of which in this case we can accuse them, but rather an entire inability to see the situation in any other light than that in which they have been officially and systematically taught. They really believe, we are told, that the war has been forced upon them, that England and her Allies were really the aggressors, and that they themselves are nothing less than the hapless victims of conspiracy, whose case requires no special pleading against the unquestioned guilt of the conspirators.

That such is the belief of the Germans argues a conclusion which gathers weight with each manifestation of such credulity. This conclusion is in a sense dual; its two constituents are interdependent. The docility of the German people, of which there is abundant evidence, is one; the other is the overmastering influence of Prussia. Such a result as we find might perhaps have been attained if these conditions co-existed in inverse proportions: an excessive docility would require a less potent force of indoctrination; the force of indoctrination more acutely concentrated would serve to suppress an awkward strain of obstinacy in the otherwise docile recipients of the national doctrine. But the impregnation

of the German people with suspicion and hatred of England is so complete that we are doubtful if either constituent has existed in anything less than an extreme form. An utter docility on the one side and an unconditioned supremacy on the other could alone account for this strange and perverted phenomenon just as nothing less, we apprehend, could fairly have produced the remarkable homogeneity of the Germans in their almost unexceptionally barbarous conduct of the war.

The interest which these ideas about the Germans carry, and the disgust which they excite, are no longer wholly novel. As the war progresses we are coming to realize more clearly the complexity of the forces which have brought it about. It is not merely the studied military preparations upon which Germany has so long concentrated; nor merely the intention of the ruling caste to turn them to account in a war of aggression; nor only that the later generations of Germans have been instructed from their youth in the religion of imperial expansion and the conquering mission of the fatherland. The more acute appreciation of these constituents which the war has produced cannot but remind us that we were not without warning of them. Considered students of Germany have long held opinions which were more than mere suspicions, and the sustained efforts of the more clear-sighted towards ensuring the maintenance of an adequate and increasing navy had a more direct object than it was always politic to define. And if the security of fancy was in some measure exploded by the revelation of the sinister pretensions of Germany in the Agadir crisis of 1911, the vigilance and suspicion which held the public mind sprang rather from a sense of sudden and unwelcome surprise than from a sober reflection of the course of historical development, of the inevitable international incidence of national aspiration.

The immediateness of the menace supplanted the facile incredulity which had obscured the workings of what Mr. Frederic Harrison described, during the naval scare of 1909, as 'the elemental springs of national destiny.' His reference was to the possibilities of war with Ger-

many, of which his historical sense bade him both beware himself and remind his country. With similar perspicacity, soon after the outbreak of the war he also traced the causes, for which the Allies are contending, back to the principles of the French Revolution. The revolt against feudalism expressed in what he preferred to call the Revolution of Europe, such was his argument, had continued to progress among all nations except Germany and Austria, her creature and ally. In this aspect it may be admitted that the broad principles of liberty and justice, which are at stake in the struggle in Europe, and are as old as the human race, enjoyed a definite re-birth a little more than a century ago. On the same analogy of a definite historical causation, the origin of the German military power, which *ex hypothesi* might be called the re-birth of feudalism, considerably preceded the European revolt against it, in which Germany and Austria have been exceptional in taking no part.

We must trace the rise of that now perverted power from the great movement which began with the acquisition of the Dukedom of Prussia by the Electors of Brandenburg, in the sixteenth century; was consolidated by the overthrowing of the Polish suzerainty in the seventeenth; and confirmed by the establishment of a kingdom in the first year of the eighteenth century. When Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, became Frederick I, King of Prussia, we perceive the first great landmark of the movement which Lord Acton thus epitomized:—'It was the work of the dynasty that a country which was less than Scotland, and was protected by no barrier of land or water, became greater than France.'[1] Frederick William I, the second king, made absolute the power of the monarchy, accumulated extensive funds, built up a powerful army, and so laid the foundation and provided the sinews of the devastating campaigns of his son, the monarch in whom Thomas Carlyle discovered his ideal. Frederick the Great so far remodelled and expanded the forces of his inheritance, and led them through

[1] *Lectures on Modern History*, p. 285.

so many wars, in which he was himself the prime aggressor, that he may fairly be considered the founder of German militarism. The rise of Prussia, so far from being a recent and sudden portent in the European sky, is rather an illustration of the ancient maxim, *Nemo repente fuit turpissimus.*

It was a new type of government which came into being in northern Europe under the direction, first of Peter the Great of Russia, and, secondly, of Frederick William I of Prussia. On the one hand it was absolute and undivided, the antithesis of the English ideal, irreconcilable with the principles which we associate with John Hampden or George Washington; on the other, it was a definite departure from the earlier autocracies of Henry VIII of England or Louis XIV of France. As Lord Acton said at Cambridge, fifteen years ago, in words which deserve a place in the records of prophecy:—'Government so understood is the intellectual guide of the nation, the promoter of wealth, the teacher of knowledge, the guardian of morality, the mainspring of the ascending movement of man. That is the tremendous power, supported by millions of bayonets, which grew up . . at Petersburg, and was developed, by much abler minds, chiefly at Berlin; and it is the greatest danger that remains to be encountered by the Anglo-Saxon race.'[1] It was through the study of history, as well as of contemporary currents, that the present war was in a sense foreseen; and perhaps we may venture the paradox that an impartial reading of history is the best guarantee of a properly patriotic partiality. For as it generates a sober pride in the national records of the past, so it prompts a wise anxiety for the national fortunes in the crises of the future. As it provides the corrective of that arrogant and irrational confidence which parades as patriotism and allows men to sleep when danger is abroad, so it condemns the craven spirit which shrinks from breaking the sacred bond of peace for the sake even of preserving the greater sanctity of national self-respect.

[1] *Lectures on Modern History*, p. 289.

THE FATE OF AUSTRIA.

The course of the war may perhaps permit a candid observer to conjure up the fulfilment of a famous literary prophecy. The revelation of the economic plight of Germany has tended to obscure the parlous condition of Austria-Hungary, her creature and ally, but the divisions which the forced consolidation of the Hapsburgs' realm has never succeeded in healing have nevertheless become accentuated. The unifying influence of the aged Emperor shows signs of weakening under the disabling conditions of an unequal external conflict; the Slav populations, always menacing, have been on the verge of open insurrection; and the propagandist activities of a peace party have taken the customary shape of riotous hostility to the Government. In these conditions it can hardly be irrelevant to recall the prophecy in which Gibbon paid to the author of *Tom Jones* the compliment which would have ensured the career of that romantic work, even if it had not already been enjoying the reputation which its merits deserved:

'Our immortal Fielding was of the younger branch of the Earls of Denbigh, who draw their origin from the Counts of Hapsburg. Far different have been the fortunes of the English and German divisions of the family. The former, the knights and sheriffs of Leicestershire, have slowly risen to the dignity of a peerage, the latter, the Emperors of Germany and Kings of Spain, have threatened the liberty of the old and invaded the treasures of the new world. The successors of Charles V may disdain their brethren of England, but the romance of *Tom Jones*, that exquisite picture of human manners, will outlive the Palace of the Escurial and the Imperial Eagle of the House of Austria.'[1]

It was almost superfluous for Thackeray in his lecture on Fielding to pay the further tribute to *Tom Jones* which nevertheless resolved itself into an adulation of Gibbon

[1] *Vide* Gibbon's *Autobiography* (ed. Murray), p. 419.

himself :—'There can be no gainsaying the sentence of this great judge. To have your name mentioned by Gibbon is like having it written on the dome of St. Peter's. Pilgrims from all the world admire and behold it.'

That *Tom Jones* is still alive and flourishing might be thought attested by the attempt of the good folk in office at Doncaster, some few years ago, to suppress the reading of it by committing it publicly to the flames.[1] Indeed the enduring health of Fielding's novel inclines one to think that there may have been more in Gibbon's prophecy than the mere effect of a graceful sentence or the turn of a sounding phrase. 'The Palace of the Escurial,' the princely residence of the Royal House of Spain, need not long arrest our argument. Gibbon used the phrase as a symbol of the Spanish throne which Charles V, son of Philip the Handsome, Archduke of Austria, inherited in the year 1516, but, in view of the maintenance of Spanish neutrality in the present war, that part of Gibbon's sentence becomes irrelevant to the point of our proposition. 'The Imperial Eagle of the House of Austria,' on the other hand, is hanging in the trembling balance, and the prophecy of the author of the *Decline and Fall* has a relevance which we may fairly seek to illustrate by a retrospective view of the records of Austro-German history in the light of the existing presage of disasters. The extensiveness of the field which lies open to inspection demands that our survey be either cursory or concentrated. As Lord Acton said, the beginnings of modern history are difficult to determine, for we may 'dimly descry the Declaration of Independence in the forests of Germany';[2] and therefore we had best direct our chief attention to the vicissitudes of fortune which the Austrian, or more properly German Empire enjoyed during the life of the English historian.

The fourth year of Gibbon's life ushered in a famous period of European history. It was the distinctive date of the dual accession of Frederick the Great to the throne of Prussia and of the Princess Maria Theresa, mother of

[1] *Vide, e.g., English Review*, Feby, 1913.
[2] *Vide* Inaugural (Cambridge 1895) *The Study of History*.

Marie Antoinette of France, to the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria. As Gibbon followed the course of the Seven Years' War which broke out just before he came of age, and during which he served for two years and a half as a captain of horse, he may have had recollections in after years of the trials which from the first beset the hapless Austrian princess, whose territories her royal neighbours set themselves with one consent to acquire. From that time until the present day the fortunes of Austria have never been wholly independent of the goodwill of Prussia. Sometimes at variance, sometimes in alliance, the relationship has never been allowed to lapse, and the mutual strife which produced the tragedy-scored scenes of the Seven Years' War has gradually given place to a condition of permanent alliance, in which Prussia is the predominant and Austria the subordinate partner. The systematic encroachment of Prussia, alike territorial and political, upon the neighbouring empire may be traced effectively for our purposes from the date when Frederick the Great fastened his desires upon Silesia, and Louis XV of France, in violation of the Pragmatic Sanction, of which he was himself a guarantor, supported the claim of the Elector of Bavaria to the entire dominions of the House of Austria. The cession of Silesia, which satisfied Frederick's ambitions, together with a promise of help from England, allowed the fortunes of Austria to take a more favourable turn; but the defeat of his French ally in 1743, when an English Sovereign, in the person of George II, fought for the last time on the Continent of Europe and led his troops to victory at Dettingen, re-awakened Frederick's hostility to Austria. A brief campaign produced a ten years' peace and the German Empire was left in 1745 under the leadership of Maria Theresa's husband, Francis I, who was acclaimed Emperor.

But Austria's immunity could be considered assured only while she accepted the dictation of Frederick. Emboldened by the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, which severed the alliance of Prussia and France, she raised the standard of war in the hope of recovering Silesia. In the second and most important campaign of the seven, however,

she sustained two crushing defeats at Rossbach and Leuthen, the latter of which was interpreted by Ranke (although Lord Acton could not regard the view as tenable) as the conclusion of a phase of history in which ecclesiastical interests prevailed in politics—a phase 'that ended when the hosts of Brandenberg went into the action at Leuthen chanting their Lutheran hymns.'[1] The Austrian opposition took varying turns in the succeeding years, and finally failed. Frederick retained Silesia, and in a few years we find Austria reluctantly acquiescing, at the instigation of Frederick, in the most brutal exposition of the doctrine that 'might is right' which the eighteenth century provided. The partition of Poland had its design in the masterly but perverted brain of Frederick. It is a salient instance of that political domination of Austria by Prussia which received even more signal illustration six years later in Frederick's veto of the Austrian proposal for a similar partition of Bavaria, and promises still at this day to seal the fate of the Dual Monarchy. Such was the trend of Austrian and Prussian relations when the observant eye of Gibbon roamed over the panorama of European politics. The ruler of Austria was still Emperor of Germany and the heritage of the Hapsburgs offered a fair rivalry to the literary product of the English branch of that illustrious House.

The course of European history, however, was destined to suffer disturbances, the consequences of which Gibbon certainly made no pretensions to prophesying. He died in the days of the French Revolution, at the beginning of the second year of the Terror; but he wholly misunderstood it, although he had spent some time in Paris, even while the storms were gathering. Moreover, he disliked it intensely, because, in Mr. Bagehot's view, he imagined himself to be the kind of person whom the Revolutionaries would certainly send to the guillotine. But no superficial view of the outlook, either at that time or in the early years of the nineteenth century would incline to suggest the elimination of 'the Imperial Eagle of the House

[1] *Ibid.*

of Austria.' For, in spite of the aftermath of the Revolution and the great defeat at Austerlitz, Vienna was chosen as the scene of the brilliant Congress which, while its members 'consulted wisely all day and danced indefatigably all night,' was rudely startled by the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba. The developments of the nineteenth century were the confirmation of the struggles of the eighteenth. The heterogeneous composition of the Austrian Empire rendered impossible the realization of nationality which was so conspicuously to mark the development and increase the strength of other countries. While the absence of nationality has been the source of Austria's continuous weakness, its vigorous cultivation by Prussia secured the annexation of the States which had once gone to form the German Empire whose capital was Vienna.

The disastrous defeat at Sadowa in 1866, followed by the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg and the Peace of Prague, at once effected the severance of the Austrian connection with Germany; and the dissolution of the German Confederation was followed by the establishment of a new North German Confederation, which required only the inclusion of the Southern States to complete the transfer of the German Empire from Austria to Prussia. The effect of the wars of 1866 and 1870 was really to set the limit upon Austrian independence; and in 1879 Austria joined in formal alliance with the newly constituted German Empire. In the present war, however, history is showing a steady refusal to repeat herself. For whereas in the past the policy of alliance with Prussia has guaranteed the safety of Austria by the assurance of external strength in compensation for the serious disabilities of internal disunion, her recent course of placid obedience in the spheres alike of treacherous diplomacy and of active war is already tending to bring upon her not only the humiliation of defeat, which sooner or later she can hardly fail to share with Germany, but even the premature retribution of internecine strife. The 'Imperial Eagle of the House of Austria' may survive the catastrophe, but hardly unshorn of the traditional splendours which gave the peculiar significance to Gibbon's prophecy.

'PACTUM SERVA.

The death-motto of Edward I may fairly be called the life-motto of the English race. *'Pactum serva'* concludes the brief inscription on Edward's 'plain tomb without mosaic, carving or effigy, amongst the splendid monuments of his kindred' in Westminster Abbey.[1] As the words seem to sum up the character of the greatest of the Plantagenets and to reveal the secret of his strong and beneficent reign, so they signify the legacy of personal duty and national obligation which it is a characteristic of the race never to repudiate. 'Keep troth' enshrines a principle which the belligerents in the European War have honoured variously in the breach and the observance. Germany's habitual violations of treaties and international conventions are the all-sufficient example of the former; and it is no excessive national pride which discovers in the British declaration and conduct of the war an undeviating loyalty to the traditions for which the race is justly famed. 'Perfidious Albion' is a taunt which leaves us as unconcerned as it is itself unwarranted. Rather must we transfer to Germany the indictment which George III pronounced in April, 1793, against Revolutionary France, which, he said, 'must be greatly circumscribed before we can talk of any means of treating with that dangerous and faithless nation.' Except that the language is almost too restrained to fit the case of our present enemy, not a syllable need be altered. *'Pactum Serva'* is nothing less than the indispensable condition of normal existence: it is the guarantee of tolerable relations both between individuals and between States. In a letter to *The Times* it was applied by the lately retired Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge to the labour dispute in the South Wales

[1] Edwardus Primus Scotorum Malleus Hic Est 1308. Pactum Serva.

coalfield. On the assumption that Edward I may have had some acquaintance with Roman Law, Professor Clark expressed the belief that Edward meant the Roman *nudum pactum*, which may fairly be taken as having its reproduction in the contractual relations of employers and employed in the industry in question under the Trades Disputes Act. *Nudum pactum*, as he explained, is 'an agreement without any sanction in the way of penalty to enforce it.'

The extent of Edward's knowledge of Roman Law need not for long concern us. His popular title, 'the English Justinian,' contains only the shadow of truth which justifies it as a convenient indication of the greatness of his work. Justinian's work was the conclusion of an earlier epoch, Edward's the beginning of a later. Justinian was engaged in collecting, excluding and harmonizing as he compressed the extensive and unmanageable body of law existing in the Roman Empire into the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. Edward's task was to formulate new law, to elaborate the existing system, almost to create a new system. And as the result of the flood of new legislation we find that Roman Law, which had been gaining ground in the previous reign, ceased to be studied by English lawyers. 'The whole field of law,' said Professor Maitland, 'was now so much covered by statute that the study of Roman Law had become useless.'[1] But in the process of establishing the distributive justice of the kingdom it is not unlikely that Edward acquired some familiarity with the *Corpus Juris* which, but for his genius, would probably have shaped the course of the legal system which the growing needs of the country demanded.[2] If, therefore, we may interpret *pactum* as *nudum pactum* we shall find in the motto with which we set out a particular relevance to the conditions upon which the war has thrown a sinister light in the international arena.

'Treaties,' said Mr. Lloyd George in the second month of the war, 'are the currency of international statesman-

[1] *Constitutional History of England*, p. 21.
[2] *Vide* E. Jenks, M.A., *Edward Plantagenet*: (Heroes of the Nations Series) pp. 336-342.

ship.' The fabric of civilization is built in part on their security. But their nature is peculiarly suggestive of the *nudum pactum*. The sacrosanctity of '*pactum serva*' as the international motto, or what Mr. Gladstone called 'the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics,' is the only sure guarantee of their faithful observance. But for that guarantee we must await a fairer day than the present. The penalty which in some degree invalidates the parallel between the *nudum pactum* and the modern treaty is war. Yet the threat of war is no sure deterrent to the guilty nation whose territorial ambition or greed of power is backed by confidence in the might of armaments. War is at once a last resort which gives the signatories of treaties the utmost opportunity of keeping troth, and a safeguard, imperfect as it is, against the permanent injustice which the breach of faith might otherwise inflict. In the present state of the world we cannot regard the various schemes of international arbitration as other than premature and even Utopian.

Yet vague and windy theories of internationalism continue to pass current in democratic circles and coteries of fanatical pacifists who seem to ignore the fact that if faithfulness is not yet the girdle of civilization it cannot be made so in a day. One country will keep troth while another will take advantage of its neighbour's honesty. If faithfulness is the general basis of relationship, the breaches are remediable by force. 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed'; and in this rough justice a just inequality is imposed in the interests of righteousness. We ourselves and the nations who are now fighting for liberty, not only our own but the liberty which consists in the restoration of rights trampled under the heel of the ruthless repudiator of agreements, must decline to treat on equal terms with 'that dangerous and faithless nation' with which we are at war. Among the strangely subversive theories of pacifism, by which the idea of patriotism has been attenuated until it is hardly recognizable save as a meagre caricature of its true nobility, there appears to be no place for that national self-respect which points

the course of duty even if it takes the form of the violent self-assertiveness of a declaration of war. We have watched the embarrassed efforts of America to maintain her lofty ideals of neutrality against the common dictates of national conscience. There are worse catastrophes than war, and more degrading, and one of them is an ignoble peace.

Pacifism takes protean forms, and one of the less drastic theories provides perhaps the best revelation of its weakness. Let it be granted that the Hague Conferences have the potentiality of an international Parliament, given the supreme condition that their decisions will be observed or that means are available for enforcing their observance. Then the scheme of arbitration may contain the solution of the desperate problems which until the dawning of the pacifist millenium have been unhappily solved in blood. The pacifist of this school trusts the majority of the signatories to prevent the violation of agreements on the part of any malcontent by the threat of arms. But what is the guarantee that the question which produces one malcontent will produce no more? If it happened to divide the nations or their representatives in the council chamber, the enforcing power resident in the majority would cease to exist as the majority approached the vanishing point. Here, surely, are the essential conditions of conflagration. If this is an extreme and unlikely contingency, it serves nevertheless to show up the possible futility, as an instrument of pacifism, of an international Parliament relying upon the force of armed majorities. For the result of this theory of pacifism by compulsion would differ from existing conditions in investing international obligations with a statutory force which, while in theory it would annul the value of the *nudum pactum*, the very freedom of which is an *a priori* advantage, at the same time could not ensure its own enforcement save by the faithful police service of the nations, among whom the sense of nebulous obligation might well tend to act as the irritant of mutual hostilities. The transitory alliances of history seem to contain the very key to the futility of an international police system organized by a representative Parliament vested with no

ultimate power beyond the loyalty of the armies which themselves would constitute the police.

The abolition of war, which is the pacifists' aim, will be attained not by the establishment of dubious powers for its prevention, but by the removal of its radical causes. The one measure will succeed, on the most favourable hypothesis, only in diverting the causes into other and perhaps no less embarrassing and even depraving courses: the other is a part of the slow development of 'the world's government, and the long patience of Providence.' Dethrone the principle of '*pactum serva*' from its place of homage, or violation, and substitute the rule of compulsory pacifism, and what will be the result? A transfer of honourable obligations at present existing between the nations into a new relationship set up between each nation and the common Parliament; an impossible substitution of legal internationalism for the principle of nationality which history has developed and disclosed as the true expression of patriotism; and a fatal and hypocritical assumption of collective righteousness in which the 'proud man' of transatlantic statesmanship would find his heaven, while the traditionally English principle of honourable action with the liberty of choice would be submerged in a babel of tongues.

FRANCE IN THE MAKING.[1]

It has been observed with some exaggeration that the nucleus of the Allies' armies in Europe has derived its strength from past defeats. Thus the British found their preliminary trial in the earlier reverses of the South African War; the Russians in their struggle with Japan; the French not indeed in the persons of their present army, but through traditions of veterans who are still living, in the war of 1870. In two instances past enemies are now allies in more than name. General Botha's brilliant campaign in South-West Africa in the one case, and the co-operation of Japan in the Far Eastern waters in the other, are evidences sufficiently concrete and pronounced. In the course of more than a century of changing alliances and readjustments of the balance of power, circumstances have invested the action of France with a consistency denied to that of her present allies. It is indeed a legacy of the French Revolution that hostility should have been sustained between France and the Central European Powers. England, allied though she be with her former enemy, has been equally consistent in her championship of freedom. For if France was at war with Absolutism she yet employed an absolutism of her own by putting the armies of the Revolution at the disposal of Napoleon. The diversion of the Revolution into an imperialism dependent upon the power of the sword was a catastrophe which had been, in some sense, foreseen by Robespierre; 'the transformation of society as he imagined, if it cost a few thousand heads in a twelvemonth was less deadly than a single day of Napoleon fighting for no worthier motive than ambition.'[2]

The hostility of England, which was more determined than that of Prussia and Austria, and was, on the whole, the guarantee of that 'security' which was the end and aim of Pitt's policy, did not afterwards prevent an alliance with

[1] Published 26th July.

[2] *Vide* Lord Acton; *Lectures on the French Revolution*, p. 300.

France in 1827, and again in 1854. These alliances were less enduring and less intense, because the conditions were less crucial than that which is bearing fruit to-day on the battlefield of Europe. But they have served to signalize the conclusion of many centuries of chivalrous warfare between England and France; and the passage of a century since Waterloo finds England still the champion of European liberty. Again, we are fighting, as Pitt said, for 'security against a danger, the greatest that ever threatened the world.'

If England was allied with those Powers against the aggression, first of the Revolutionary, and afterwards of the imperial armies of France, her energies were rightly directed to the salvation of Europe, first from the menace of the movement which had made an end of the monarchy, and, secondly, from the tyranny threatened by the personal ambitions of one man whose genius could transform a popular revolution into the means of a career of conquest. The greatest revolution of history was not exceptional in producing a tyrant; but the tyrant was himself exceptional. The ubiquitous progress of the Revolutionary principles, which themselves had triumphed over the age-long tyranny of aristocrats and kings, might fairly require a reign of peace, not the dictatorship of another tyrant who could force the Rights of Man upon Europe only by sowing the seeds of universal anarchy. The conservatism of England prepared for its own evolution by an alliance with Absolutism. For if Europe survived the conquests of Napoleon, she was conquered by the Revolution. The passing of that strange portent whom Lord Acton described as 'the most splendid genius that has appeared on earth'[1], was a signal step in the victory of the idea; and it is only in the two absolute monarchies of Germany and Austria that the main principles of the Revolution have made no progress. The present war may be described as, in a limited sense, a reversal of the Napoleonic, but a renewal of the Revolutionary wars, with the addition of Great Britain Russia, and even Italy, on the revolutionary side. And

[1] *Historical Essays and Studies*, p. 458.

it cannot be irrelevant to consider an aspect of the earlier wars which had a definite place in the Revolution. For the Revolution and the European War are inseparable: the action of each upon the other produced, by a combination of spontaneous development and deliberate policy, the army which was to set the standard for modern Europe.

The month of July was conspicuous in the calendar of Revolutionary France. The storming of the Bastille on the 14th July, 1789, was the first act which gave to civilian Paris the potentiality of a military instrument. The strain of civil war, which was never entirely absent after that date, prepared the Revolution for the greater struggle which began with the declaration of war against the Austrian Empire in April, 1792. Whatever the general force of anniversaries in national life, the celebrations of at least two anniversaries of the fall of the Bastille contributed to the military strength of the Revolution. The federation of delegates from the National Guard, who assembled in Paris on the 14th July, 1790, lent a military colour to the national movement which was already beginning to disclose itself in a public opinion hostile to the monarchy. On the same anniversary in 1792, three months after the declaration of war, the presence of armed representatives from the provinces gave to the Revolutionary, which was becoming in fact the national, spirit, a stimulus and confidence which the condition of the armies in the field neither supplied nor warranted.

The consciousness of deficiency not seldom generates the defiance of desperation. A state of war had been in existence for three months, and although as yet no clash of arms had taken place, France was in no mood to receive an ultimatum from Prussia. But in that same month of July, within a fortnight of the anniversary celebrations, the Duke of Brunswick, who was in supreme command of the Allied armies, startled and confirmed the Revolution with a manifesto inspired by Marie Antoinette. To concede to Brunswick's declaration would have been to annul the Revolution; and his threat of military execution upon Paris gave the reins to that violent outburst of antinomian feeling which turned the populace upon the palace

on the 10th August. The imprisonment of the King made way for a new executive, which applied itself with directness to the prosecution of the war, and after the passage of an eventful year we find the military factor more than ever the governing influence.

The year had been marked by two circumstances which transformed and intensified the war—the invasion of France and the execution of the King. The invasion was thwarted by the unexpected resistance of the Revolutionary troops at Valmy; and the new confidence of the French expressed itself in a counter-invasion of the Low Countries. The execution of Louis XVI brought England, Holland and Spain into the scale against France; for although the Powers failed to save the monarchy, they were compelled to sustain the struggle with the Republic. But the Republic, inspired by the new political gospel, invited the hostility of Europe before its own military strength was equal to so vast a conflict. Faced by the necessity of raising unlimited forces, the Revolution found its salvation in a thoroughly autocratic executive which proved the most potent instrument in the process alike of bringing the military fortunes of the Republic to a successful issue, and of providing Napoleon with the nucleus of his armies. The Committee of Public Safety, which was established in Paris on the 10th July, 1793, at the close of the three months executive administration of its predecessor of the same name, is chiefly associated with the excesses of the Reign of Terror, in which Robespierre has been popularly regarded as the responsible and governing influence. On the 27th July, Robespierre entered the Committee and remained the apparently dominant figure for exactly a year. On the 27th July, 1794, his power collapsed; and on the next day he was guillotined. 'We reach the end of the Reign of Terror on the 9th of Thermidor, the most auspicious date in modern history.'[1] But although 'Robespierre was absolute in April,' and the terror ceased with his fall, it was not because he was either its sole or even its chief supporter, but because the populace which adored him

[1] *Vide* Lord Acton: *Lectures on the French Revolution*, p. 284.

thought that he desired it. And when at his fall popular feeling ceased to support it, the Committee of Public Safety could no longer maintain it. But it had already done its work, and saved the Republic.

The conditions of the present war may enable a clearer understanding of the policy which directed the Reign of Terror. If any one man was responsible for it more than another it was Carnot, in whom was personified the military brain of the Republic. The Revolution had grown into a war of defence; the war of defence had become a war of aggression; and the enemy was nothing less than Europe. The Committee which had the conduct of the war under its control must stand or fall with the success of the French arms; and all that is implied for us in recruiting campaigns, national service, various forms of stimulus to patriotic service, munitions and national register bills, the promise of rewards and decorations, and in extreme cases the incidence of martial law—all these agencies by which the resources of the nation are applied to the fulfilment of the one supreme purpose were summed up in one instrument.[1] The punishment of treason, a wide term which included incompetent generalship in the field and hindrances, of whatever kind, to the military policy of the Committee, took the form of the guillotine. The war was conducted with the Damocles' sword of capital punishment overhanging the generals' heads. The Reign of Terror was nothing more nor less than a state of exaggerated martial law, and as such it was successful. Its extinction followed the completion of its work. The French armies, after some early and threatening reverses, had everywhere gained the ascendancy before the middle of July, and from the military, as distinct from the moral, aspect the policy of the great Committee must be allowed the justification of success.

The French Revolution, which invites prejudice against itself, cannot alienate English affection from France. The ideal of relationship, which has been at length fulfilled in the *Entente*, was expressed by numbers of Frenchmen after the fall of the Bastille. Not realizing that France

[1] Mr. Hilaire Belloc observes that 'the Committee of Public Safety was the Caesar of Revolutionary France.' *Vide* his *French Revolution*, p. 134.

must first go to war for an idea, they shook the hand of Dr. Rigby, an Englishman, who was at the Palais Royal, and exclaimed with indescribable joy:—'We, too, are free men, and there will never be war between our countries.'[1] To-day, after a century and a quarter, we may take more confidence in that prophecy. For the Revolution and the great War which deluged with blood the 'pleasant land of France' and half the continent of Europe, were the birth-pangs of the new nationality and the renewing of a mighty nation—

> Furious in luxury, merciless in toil,
> Terrible with strength renewed from a tireless soil.[2]

The ancient and chivalrous enemy is now the strong and valiant friend, whose alliance we rejoice to honour in the last and fiercest struggle against the armies of Absolutism.

[1] Dr. Rigby was the author of some valuable *Letters from France* in 1789 (published in London in 1880).

[2] *Vide* Rudyard Kipling's *France*, published in 1913.

A NAVAL MORAL.[1]

The first of August, like the 'Glorious First of June,' is a notable date in British naval history. The battle of the Nile in 1798 was the assurance of the supremacy at sea which England had established on the 1st June, 1794. The earlier, which stands out from the records of an inglorious phase of our history, was the only engagement in the war of the First Coalition against the French Republic of which we can speak with pride. The later, which marked the summit of a new phase, was the chief of a series of naval victories which relieved the growing apprehension in the dark days of Napoleon's early ascendancy. A temporary peace on the Continent of Europe had left England without an ally. France was threatened, therefore, only on the sea. The English army, which had been operating on the Continent, was both small in numbers and deficient in generalship: its weakness in performance had lowered the reputation of England as a military power. It was to the sea that Napoleon then directed his attention, and at sea that his immediate designs were defeated.

An attempt to provoke insurrection in Ireland was happily frustrated, but Napoleon had great ambitions in the East. With a splendid audacity he undertook a six weeks' voyage with fleet and transports through the Mediterranean, followed by Nelson. The rapid subjugation of Egypt was the preliminary to the annexation of India. An Indian insurrection against the English occupation was the promised accompaniment of his own invasion. Such was the scheme which he laid before the Directory at Paris. Whatever assurance he may have received of the likelihood of the rising on which he counted, his hopes were doomed to a disappointment not less decisive than the stultifying answer which India has presented to the German calculations in these latter days. It is at once tempting and hardly excessive to say that

[1] 1st August (published 31st July.)

Nelson and the Nile saved India. For although Napoleon's secondary ambitions of Syrian conquest, which were shattered soon afterwards at Acre, may have been directed by the ulterior motive of further eastern aggression, it can have been no more than a forlorn hope. But his virile genius was rarely more conspicuous than under the failure of the Mediterranean expedition. Magnificent in conception and rich in the promise of its early execution, the very contrast of its failure on the 1st August in Aboukir Bay might well have proved crippling to one whose ambitions were unbalanced by indomitable pertinacity. The abandonment of the eastern scheme found the future emperor back in Paris. There followed in quick succession the fall of the Directory and the establishment of the Consulate: and within two years of the Nile, when his Marshal, Moreau, was threatening Vienna, Napoleon, the First Consul, had crossed the Alps and secured Lombardy at Marengo.

To pursue the career of Napoleon and the course of the great wars which present so arresting a parallel to the present situation is not properly germane to the limited subject of our notice. There is, nevertheless, one simple lesson in which the relation of the battle of the Nile to the succeeding course of the European crisis is illustrative of the part of naval warfare in the general history of war. With certain reservations it may be stated as a general rule that in the case of countries of insular position, or possessed of an extensive seaboard, or dependent upon or interested in a large overseas trade, naval strength is primarily protective, both in peace and war; that in war, when it necessarily assumes a more aggressive rôle, it is still to a great extent a negative force; that its constructive work is chiefly contributory, even in the case of the most desperate, intense and conclusive engagements, to the really decisive actions, which are determined on land. The naval battle may be, perhaps, greater in comparison, but its decisiveness is generally indirect either in preparing for a final stroke, or in concluding the course of operations, on land. Ancient history affords an instance which is not irrelevant. The battle of Aegospotami, near the point where the Dardanelles broadens

into the Sea of Marmora, was the final encounter in the Peloponnesian war.[1] But it is unlikely that the fate of Athens would have been long arrested if the battle had gone in her favour. It would be nearer the truth to find the deciding actions nine years earlier at Syracuse, and to connect the downfall of the Athenian Empire with the vacillating policy of its general, Nicias, and the captivity of its armies in the mines of Sicily.

It must, however, be admitted that the Athenians suffered a naval as well as a military catastrophe at Syracuse. The strength of Athens was chiefly maritime: and here it is necessary to make one of our reservations. A naval disaster sustained by a sea Power may sometimes prove directly decisive. For this reason, among others, the maintenance of the naval strength of Great Britain has been properly accounted a first call upon the national finances. It is thus that as an empire our invincibility on the seas has been at once our strength and weakness. Our supreme confidence in the British fleet has certainly tended to blind us to the solemn truth that an army is required of us, as well as a navy, if we would make more than a negative contribution to the defeat of Germany. This is not to underrate the navy's accomplishment. Its contribution has been invaluable and indispensable; but it has been made virtually without fighting; and in war it is our business to fight. The battle of the Nile, which prevented the consummation of Napoleon's eastern designs and inspired England with confidence and her enemies with a just regard for her mastery of the sea, did not prevent the continuance of his wars of ambition on the continent of Europe. Trafalgar, moreover, was followed by Austerlitz and Jena, in a sequence which points the same moral. And there was no contemplation of naval victories, except, perhaps, as contributory factors, in Pitt's assertion that Napoleon would give way wherever his armies encountered a national resistance, and that the place for such a resistance was Spain. Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula were

[1] B.C. 405.

a sufficient demonstration of the truth of what was perhaps the most amazing of all prophecies in political history.[1]

The significance attaching to Nelson's victory of the Nile, which enhanced the power and reputation of England on the sea, is not less apparent in that of the first of June which had established them. A few weeks later in the same year, the French victory over the Austrians at Fleurus gave the Republic a corresponding ascendancy on the Continent.[2] It was, indeed, the first landmark in the military aggression of France which had been initiated by the cannonade of Valmy and was not to be abandoned for twenty years. Apart, however, from its place in our proposition, the battle of the first of June contained a suggestion of present conditions. The occasion of the battle was the attempt of the United States to provide France with supplies of food. The attempt proved successful. For the English Admiral, Howe, who gained the day, did not succeed in intercepting the fleet of 130 merchantmen from Chesapeake Bay. But the chief glory of the fight was the single action between the *Brunswick* and the *Vengeur du Peuple*, a dramatic event which revealed at their best the characteristics and chivalrous instincts of the rival races. After a fierce engagement in which the two ships became entangled, the anchor of one with the rigging of the other, the *Brunswick* drew away disabled, and the *Vengeur*, which had been hit below the waterline, began to sink. The conclusion is told by Lord Acton :—'The guns were thrown over-board, but after some hours the *Vengeur* made signals that she was sinking. English boats came and rescued about 400 men out of 723. Those of the survivors who were not wounded were seen

[1] This prophecy was related by the Duke of Wellington to the Spanish General Alava as having been made by Pitt at a dinner party after the news of the Austrian surrender at Ulm, and was accepted by Lord Acton (*vide* Inaugural on *The Study of History*, pp. 60 and 61, which is published also in *Lectures on Modern History*.) But Dr. Holland Rose doubts its authenticity on the grounds that such confidence was quite foreign to the convictions which Pitt's experience of Spain had produced in him, and that his reliance on the statics of state-craft rather than on the dynamics of nationality was against the likelihood of his speculating on the trustworthiness of the latter, (*William Pitt and the Great War*, p. 524.)

[2] 26th June, 1794.

standing by the broken mast, and cried *"Vive la république"* as the ship went down.'[1] It is no exaggeration to say that the spirit thus displayed survives at the root of the *Entente* between France and Great Britain, as assuredly as it is incomprehensible to the depraved exponents of organized piracy.

The policy of our enemies will serve as the last illustration of our proposition. It is their acknowledged protest and, as they profess, their only means of retaliation against the British mastery of the seas. The action of the British fleet, which has established an effective blockade of the German seaboard and held the German fleet in a state of impotence, at once galling and humiliating, is in a true sense contributory to the operations of the Allied armies; but it is a contribution which is nothing less than indispensable. And whether the German navy will be compelled at length to join battle or not, the truth remains that

> The fleet of England is her all in all
> And in her fleet her fate.

[1] *Lectures on the French Revolution*, pp. 322, 323.

VALMY.[1]

The decisiveness of battles is not necessarily determined by the actual military accomplishment, by the magnitude of engagements or by the completeness of victory or defeat. These may, or may not, be deciding factors in an ultimate issue, but history alone can determine decisiveness in an historical sense, that is, the extent to which a given engagement exercises an effect which, whatever the operation of immediate and direct causes, is ultimately attributable to no other initial force in the same degree. Thus it is that history presents the paradox that the least apparently decisive of battles should take its place among the historic fifteen, that the least significant in casualties and in military accomplishment should have determined the course of the twenty-three years of almost incessant war which came to an end at Waterloo. The cannonade of Valmy fulfilled these singular conditions. It was the first serious trial of the French Revolutionary army which gained the day on the 20th September, 1792, to its own amazement and that of the Prussian invaders. It may be said that through the military ascendancy, which hardly deserved the name of victory, the most critical phase of the Revolution had passed.

The ideas of 1789 invited the aggression of the European Powers, for the Revolutionary conviction had more than merely national reference. The intensity of the Revolution could mean logically nothing less than disapproval and defiance of all tyrannies, on the Revolutionary hypothesis, *i.e.*, of all forms of government which failed to conform to the new ideals of liberty established in France. It was, in fact, a challenge to the other Great Powers, for it was an attempt to establish those ideals in the public law of Europe. The appeal to Austria, which the desperation of the Queen might well dictate and excuse, presented the

[1] September 20th (Published September 21st.)

required occasion, and the Revolutionary leaders, who for the most part desired war, declared it, in April, 1792, against Austria. But it was impossible by such declaration to confine the approaching conflict to two countries. Prussia not only joined her forces, but took a leading part in the aggression, which was designed to put an end to the Revolution. Confronted by the powerful alliance of Austria and Prussia, the French were ill-prepared to defend their country. Had the advance of the Allies been immediately and rapidly executed, the Revolution would have been suppressed and the monarchy saved. In the event, however, four months passed before the Duke of Brunswick, who was accounted the best general of his time, reached the French frontier. That date was the 19th August, and, as Mr. Hilaire Belloc has put it with an admirable lucidity and an unconscious relevance to the present war:—'The village is called Redange; thence did the privileged of Europe set out to reach Paris and to destroy democracy. The first task occupied them for full twenty-two years; upon the latter they are still engaged.'[1]

The delay was fortunate or fatal according to the view which applauds or condemns the Revolution. The spirit of Paris which had been fired by the manifesto at the end of July was exasperated by the invasion at the end of August. As the former drove the populace to assail the palace, so the latter produced another and fiercer display of the 'severe justice of the people.' The news of the fall of Longwy precipitated the September massacres in anticipation of the fall of Verdun, which was felt to be the last stronghold before Paris itself. Verdun fell on the 2nd September, and the allied armies advanced on the 11th to a point over against the line of the Argonne which was held by the French general, Dumouriez. The Argonne, which has become once more familiar in the present war, could be crossed only by three passes, 'the Thermopylae of France' as Dumouriez called them. The southernmost, Les Islettes, which lay between Clermont and St. Ménehould on the road from Verdun to Châlons and Paris,

[1] *The French Revolution*, p. 118.

famous for Drouet's ride in pursuit of the King the year before, was the natural course for the invaders to take. It was held, however, by the French throughout. But Dumouriez fell back from the more northerly passes, and at the same time summoned Kellermann with the army of Metz, and Beurnonville from Lille, who arrived on the 19th. Meanwhile the Prussians, who no longer held a superiority in numbers, had come through the pass known as Grandpré, and were facing the Revolutionary army with the Catalaunian Plain in their rear. This was the situation on the morning of the 20th September, when the Prussians gave battle with a light-hearted confidence and discovered the unexpected strength of the Revolution.

The engagement at Valmy, however, does not deserve the name of a battle; it is properly described as a cannonade. The French held their ground in the absence of an attack which was not delivered because they showed this unexpected resolution. For when they had sustained the loss of some 300 men without showing any suspicion of weakening, the Prussians, whose losses were only 184, ceased firing, and the fight was over. The defeat which was implied by the retirement of the Prussians after this ineffective cannonade was political rather than military. The result would not have been a defeat at all if the popular assumption were correct that the army which held its ground really consisted of raw levies. If it was the first trial of the Revolutionary army, it must be admitted that that army, and especially the artillery, which was chiefly concerned at Valmy, was largely composed of regulars with only an infusion of the volunteers of 1791. *'Ce ne sont pas les volontaires de* 1792 *qui triomphèrent à Valmy et à Jemmappes'* is the judgement of M. Hauterive; *'ce furent nos vieilles troupes de ligne.'*[1] It has to be remembered that the army of the monarchy, numbering at full strength about 220,000, had become the army of the Revolution. This is a most important consideration and an

[1] *L'Armée Sous la Revolution*, p. 246.—Jemmappes, which marked the first step in the invasion of the Low Countries, was fought on the 6th November, about seven weeks after Valmy.

effectual answer to the democratic theory that freedom and patriotic fervour proved themselves an all-sufficient force against the disciplined armies of Europe; that, in fact, the victory at Valmy was a demonstration of the superiority of shrieking indiscipline over ordered military service.

The explosion of the Revolutionary legend does not detract from the supremely decisive significance which attaches to Valmy. It lay in the discovery that the Revolutionary forces (of whatever composition) could present a solid resistance to the best of European armies. 'The nation discovered,' as Lord Acton said, 'that the Continent was at its mercy, and the war begun for the salvation of monarchy became a war for the expansion of the Republic. It was founded at Paris and consolidated at Valmy.'[1] It is not extravagant to say that it was the idea of nationality which showed itself victorious at Valmy. The French soldiery remained indifferent to the Revolutionary theory, although its attachment to the monarchy had been alienated by the flight to Varennes; but it was profoundly concerned to defend France from the external danger which threatened her. 'The invasion of 1792 roused a crouching lion, and the French, after their easy and victorious defence, went over to the attack.'[2]

The prophetic eye of Goethe, who watched the cannonade of Valmy, foresaw the coming change. It was the conquest of Europe of which Valmy was the herald which enabled the Revolution to establish idea, not as the substitute for force, but as the right if not the sole warrant for its employment. The idea of nationality became, indeed, so powerful an influence that the provisions of the Congress of Vienna which ignored it, in 1815, were invested with none of the guarantees of permanence. It is the idea of which the Allied nations are warring to-day to prevent or avenge the violation.

For Prussia, or Germany, proved herself the most apt assimilator of the Napoleonic system, which she turned to her own account. Not only the pressure of the victories,

[1] *Lectures on the French Revolution*, p. 218.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 220.

but the introduction of the reforms of Napoleon, ministered to the recovery of Prussian nationality. It was not only in the humiliation of defeat at Jena and in submission to the terms imposed at Tilsit that Prussia found the source of her regeneration. It was also by the faithful adoption of the new French system as the model for the reconstitution of both State and army. A national army was established in place of the hired mercenaries of former days. And Prussia proved the potency of the system by her contribution to the subjection of its author. But she resented what she realized was the course of national wisdom to adopt. She had not forgotten the military glories of Frederick the Great ; Rossbach was still a rallying memory in the dark days of defeat. His were the ideas of force, and Prussia grafted the new idea of nationality, with all the strength of national institutions, upon the inherited system of force. The new German Empire thus came to represent the pursuance of the twin theories of nationality and force, until within a decade of its establishment the deification of the latter by reliance upon the basic strength of the former made Germany the leading military Power in Europe.

To the recent and present appalling consequences we need not refer. But the recovery and growth of Prussia as a consequence itself of the Revolution and the European War was sufficiently irregular and arresting to illustrate the saying that the kernel of the riddle lies in a variant. The deciding factors must be found as well in Jena, in Waterloo and other influences as in Valmy. But since it was the defeat of the Prussians at Valmy which gave the reins to the great enterprise of Continental conquest, we shall not incur the charge of exaggeration if we detect in present happenings a remote consequence of that unpretentious cannonade.

A PERIL AND A MORAL: A TRIPLE ANNIVERSARY.[1]

That 'the true science of war is the history of war' was a dictum of Max Müller's which reminds us of a reference wider than its own. The history of war is as well political as military, and is essential to the consideration of a conflict whose widely-extended incidence is equalled only by the ramifications of its historic roots. The ideas and influences, which have made us what we are, yield a fair account of themselves to the student of modern times who makes no pretension to so serious a scrutiny of their remoter origins. For although the development of the systems and political nexus of modern States is comparatively recent, the few centuries of modern history in which it has taken place provide so concentrated a succession of revolutions and rebuildings, of destructive wars and reconstructive relationships, that the application of the historical method must yield results sufficient to satisfy the rule of probability. The exhaustiveness of comparison is assured by the inexhaustibility of the sources.

To go back no further than the hurricane of revolution which broke over France and embroiled the whole of Europe, in conditions which are as familiar as any phase of modern history, we find the most relevant source of comparison with the present war. Threatened with a military despotism which in 1804 assumed the imperial title and displaced the venerable institution of the Holy Roman Empire, Europe renewed in considered earnest the struggle which had been decreed by the invasion of 1792. In 1805 Pitt formed the Third Coalition. England, Russia and Austria combined to maintain the security of the nations against the aggressor. Prussia had not yet abandoned the neutrality which she had observed since the Treaty of Basle in 1795. And it was not until after the

[1] Jena, Auerstädt, Hastings, 14th Oct.

severe defeat of the two Continental Allies at Austerlitz that she revealed the jealousy in arms and the love of independent conquest which had distinguished her part in the Seven Years' War and are responsible for the miseries of the present war. The infringement of the Prussian border and the offer of Napoleon to restore Hanover to England, although he had already made it over to Prussia, determined Frederick William III upon the course which the persuasiveness of Prussian counsellors strengthened his own inclinations to adopt. But his defiance was the height of his achievement. For on the 14th October, 1806, within a fortnight of his declaration of war, two Prussian corps sustained defeats as decisive as Austerlitz itself, at Jena and Auerstädt. Napoleon at once overran Prussia, occupied Berlin on the 25th, entered Poland, and within two months was in possession of Warsaw.

The completeness of the defeat might well have suggested a submission to Napoleon from which there could be no hope of recovery. But we have already remarked [1] the readiness of Prussia to benefit by the system imposed upon her, and even to endure the harsh treatment which accompanied it. For if Napoleon invited his own catastrophe by the crowning blunder of his Russian policy, it goes rather to show the fallibility of the greatest military genius than to diminish the accomplishment of the Allies [2]. The successive disasters of Moscow and Leipzic, both in their respective years within two days of the anniversary of Jena, were the earnest of the Allies' ascendancy in central Europe which the English triumphs in the Peninsula had gone far to render possible. The recovery of Prussia in those seven years which parted Leipzic from Jena is a study in adroit assimilation of an alien polity, perhaps the most signal application of the maxim *fas est et ab hoste doceri*. This is the contingency

[1] *Vide* Essay on *Valmy*.

[2] It is no unreflecting detraction of Napoleon to speak of his fallibility; for had he been infallible he would probably have been unconquerable. As a fact he was the first to acknowledge his mistakes. 'At Dresden he confessed with magnanimity that the worst blunders of the Russian campaign were his own.' The whole undertaking was, of course, a blunder after incurring the national resistance in Spain. For such confession of failure, *vide* Lord Acton, *Historical Essays*, pp. 454,457.

for which above all others the Allied nations must be prepared after the defeat of so scientific and adaptable a people as the Germans. That their defeat is assured we cannot doubt; it is the permanence of its effect which is problematical, for permanence in such a connection is at best a matter of comparative duration. As Prussia profited by the lessons of her defeat and submission in 1806, so Germany will seek to profit by the experience of her new catastrophe. But the fulfilment of the precedent contained in her own history requires the conclusion of present hostilities at a point which the Allies can only countenance as premature. It is not Germany alone that has realized the moral of 1806-13. It is clear to the Allies that a repetition of that recovery would mean the renewal of a potential despotism such as that of which Prussia then ministered to the destruction. And their determination to drive their victory to a point as decisive as that of a hundred years ago is the sole security against the rapid renewal of the menace of military despotism.

From this precedent of recurring peril we may turn to the counter-precedent of strong and successful resistance. For closely as the dual defeat of Prussia affected the fortunes of England and of all who defied the tyrannical pretensions of Napoleon, it was primarily the end of the independent venture of the Power which had remained aloof at Austerlitz. Great as was the contribution of Prussia, through the recovery which is Germany's precedent to-day, to the ultimate subjugation of the tyrant, it is elsewhere that we find a key to the really determining factor. It was England who saved Europe, as Pitt believed that she would. Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, may well be cited as her sufficient contributions. But the secret lies deeper than in the immediate call to grapple with the crisis for which neither herself nor her Allies were fairly prepared. And it is not fanciful to accept fortuitous guidance and return to foundations which lie beyond the portals of modern history.

By a coincidence which is suggestive in more than common measure, the anniversary of Jena and Auerstädt is also that of Hastings. The accession of William the

Norman, by right constitutionally not of conquest but of the election which established his shadowy claim to succession by the alleged choice of Edward the Confessor, takes us back 740 years from the crucial date of our consideration. But it is hardly extravagant in the light of constitutional history to find in the conquest of 1066 the foundation of the English nation. The strong rule of William planted the monarchy upon a national basis and consolidated the Anglo-Saxon system with no great introduction of Norman institutions but a greater infusion of Norman ideas [1]. The effect, indeed, was greater than is properly comprehended in constitutional history alone. For the Norman monarchy transformed the loosely related peoples of Anglo-Saxon England into an united nation, and thus secured that concentration of internal strength which is the guarantee of expanding influence. The process was, of course, as gradual as the mere statement of its action is condensed; and William's reign saw no more than the beginnings of the work which followed from his own monarchical establishment. There lies, however, the foundation of the monarchy which, in spite of constitutional struggles, that not only arrested the tendency to monarchical encroachment, but allowed only the strongest kings to maintain a shadow of their original prerogatives, yet endured as the central idea of the English Constitution. And so at the close of the eighteenth century the political divisions which deceived the French revolutionaries into declaring war upon England were so far from undermining the English monarchy that the latter was consolidated rather than shaken by the execution of Louis XVI.

The anxiety of George III, which was as great as that of any Continental monarch, to avert the surrender of the

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[1].—William confirmed the English Laws; 'This I will and order that all shall have and hold the law of King Edward as to lands and all other things with these additions which I have established for the good of the English People.' Professor Maitland observes—'...it must be admitted that there has been a large infusion of Norman ideas. Occasionally though rarely we can place our finger on a rule or an institution and say "this is not English"....But still more often we can only say that a new meaning, a new importance has been given to an old institution. The valuable thing that the Norman Conquest gives us is a strong kingship which makes for national unity'—*Constitutional History of England*, p. 9.

traditional dignities of monarchy; the determination of Pitt to prevent the fulfilment of Rousseau's dream of the substitution of the laws of nature for the laws of nations; the efforts of Burke to convince the country of the insecurity of property inevitable from the spread of French ideas—these were among the influences which strengthened the general feeling of indignation at the execution of Louis and combined to unite the country at the opening of the war. But the last critical months before the outbreak of war provide a key to the difficulties with which Pitt was faced in his attempts to maintain a right policy towards the internal affairs of France. As against the Whig sympathizers with the Revolution on the one hand and the aggressive royalism of which Burke was the chief exponent on the other other, the preservation of neutrality was no easy matter. English divisiveness would, and did, encourage French aggression: English aggression would strengthen the Revolution and probably hasten the execution of Louis, which Burke pronounced inevitable because, as he said, the revolutionaries, who were both accusers and judges, were assassins. The story of Danton's supposed undertaking to save Louis for £40,000 is full of suggestiveness even if, as is probable, it be untrue. Pitt was reported to have confessed to Maret, who afterwards became Napoleon's Foreign Minister, that he purposely hesitated to offer the money until it was too late because 'the execution of the King of France would raise such a storm in England that the Whigs would be submerged.'[1] While this report was accepted and thus related by Lord Acton, it has been rejected by Dr. Holland Rose as a Whig slander, which is the more probable explanation.[2] But in either event it goes to show something of the nature and extent of English political disunion. Nevertheless the majority of the Whig opposition, from which Burke had detached himself on his anti-revolutionary or royalist principles, deserted Fox and followed Burke to the support of the Government when the national cause had been

[1] *Vide* Lord Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution*, pp. 253, 254.
[2] *William Pitt and the Great War*, p. 94n.

definitely formulated in war with the regicide Republic. In truth it was greatly to the credit of Burke that England had been awakened to the growing peril across the Channel. For although his speeches, through their very intellectual splendour, had become ineffectual in a Commons House composed of dull squires and prosaic merchants, yet the writings to which he resorted with the perseverance of a patriot had gone far towards converting the country to the opinions which he considered paramount.

A small yet powerful clique of Whigs, however, remained more or less consistent in its opposition to the national policy, and sometimes figured in a positive championship of the enemy. The authority of Fox and his followers was infinitely greater throughout that protracted crisis than the opposition to the Allies' policy which could be mustered to-day in all the Allied nations put together. The Prime Minister of to-day, faced by an actually greater task and shouldering a heavier burden, at least enjoys the advantage of national unanimity, whereas the presence of political enemies within the national camp perhaps rendered Pitt's rôle relatively more exacting. Again, the solidarity of the *Entente* may be set against the shiftiness of England's Continental Allies which proved all but baffling to the great statesman of the Napoleonic wars. A separate peace, which is abjured to-day by the unanimous compact of the Allied nations, was readily concluded by the Continental members of Pitt's coalitions whenever they suffered a defeat at the hands of Napoleon. The consequent isolation of England was of little concern to them beside the temporary safety to which subservience to Napoleon furnished the way of least resistance. And it was only after many years of subjection that their determination to be rid of the tyrant was formulated in a policy consistent with that which England maintained under the influence of Pitt and his political successors.

The faithfulness and truth which mark the *Entente* in comparison with the defections, of which even Russia was guilty in the struggle with France, must be attributed in a large measure to the growth of nationality which has expressed itself in a national consciousness and conscien-

tiousness. But little improvement is discernible in the case of the Central European Powers whose unreliability as allies has had its logical fulfilment in their barbarous antinomianism as enemies. So great were the difficulties which confronted Pitt as well abroad as at home that 'as well might one attempt out of rubble to build a cannon-proof rampart' as 'to frame a solid league against Revolutionary France.'[1]

Yet it was Pitt in whom Napoleon discovered his master. Not indeed in the life of the great Englishman was the victory won, for even as he died the crumbling of the Third Coalition on the storm-swept Continent, after Austerlitz, was almost the portent of disaster. But the pursuit and consolidation of his policy proved in after years the salvation not of England only but of Europe, and so secured the fulfilment of his famous prophecy. In spite of political factions, England was on the whole united. In spite of the mismanagement of the long war, which the most patriotic of historians will hardly deny, we still find a precedent by which the loyalty of England and the Empire to the principle which is at stake will prove again, nay is already proving, the assurance of the tyrant's fall. For while it is not true to say that history repeats itself in fact, it is manifest that moral issues recur with wonderful precision. To-day, in the face of a tyrannous Power which has been growing for a century since the years when, under subjection to Napoleon, it caught the contagion of his ambitious policy, the British nation is more than fulfilling the precedent of unity and resolution which the failures and divisiveness of a hundred years ago did more to illuminate than to obscure. For it was when to the conscientious aggression of the Revolution had succeeded the self-considering ambition of a single tyrant, when the ideas of liberty had been supplanted by the fact of absolutism, that the solidarity of the English nation, gathered round the central and unifying principle of monarchy, sustained the cause of security through the disasters of Austerlitz and Jena and saved the liberties of Europe.

[1] *Ibid* p. 561.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. AND A. E. CLARIDGE AT THE CAXTON WORKS,
FRERE ROAD, BOMBAY, FOR THE AUTHOR.

00031815

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 11 March, 2020